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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays examining the impact of information
asymmetries in context of entrepreneurship and finance. Chapter 2, coauthored
with Silvana Krasteva and Liad Wagman, focuses on the asymmetries between a
firm and its (researcher) employee and studies the problem faced by a (researcher)
employee when choosing whether to pursue an innovative idea as part of his em-
ployment at a firm or to form a start-up. An idea by its stand-alone value and
by the degree of (positive or negative) externality that it may impose on the em-
ploying firm’s existing profits if brought to market. The employee has private
information about the innovation and his ability to independently develop it. In-
ternal exploration, while allowing the employee to take advantage of any explo-
ration support offered by the firm, reduces the employee’s claim over his idea.
We find that external exploration takes place for ideas weakly related to the firm’s
existing offerings, with other ideas being explored internally. We show that if the
firm increases its support for exploration, it can induce the internal research of
a wider range of ideas; however, by doing so, the firm also increases the likeli-
hood of employees departing to pursue independent ventures at a later stage of
development.
Chapter 3 analyzes the benefits of reducing information asymmetry in the
credit markets. In their attempt to make more informed decisions, lenders of-
ten use a variety of information contained in a borrower’s credit report. We find
that if a borrower expects his future lenders to base their decisions not only on his
repayment history but also on other factors like his income, length of history, etc.,
then his incentives to repay his present loan are weakened. In this case, he is more
ii
likely to strategically default on his loan especially for very high levels of inter-
est rates. However, use of this extra information assists the lender in expeditious
screening of the borrowers. Based on our results, we recommend that, in order to
minimize defaults, more repayment history based products should be offered by
the lenders. Evidence supporting the validity of this recommendation is provided
in Chapter 4, coauthored with Vijetha Koppa. Using data from Prosper.com, we
analyze the effect of reporting repayment histories to an additional credit bureau
on borrowers’ default rates and lenders’ internal rates of return. A differences-
in-differences comparison between high risk and low risk borrowers reveals that
for high risk borrowers, the default rates were 9 to 11 percentage points greater
and the internal rates of return were 13 percentage points lower in the pre-change
period.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The seminal works of Akerlof (1970) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) high-
lighted some of the undesirable effects produced by information asymmetries
in the markets and suggested that reducing information asymmetry results in a
Pareto optimal outcome. This dissertation analyzes the impact of information
asymmetry on employee start-ups; and benefits of reducing information asym-
metry in consumer credit markets. This dissertation is organized as follows.
In Chapter 2, coauthored with Silvana Krasteva and Liad Wagman, we analyze
the information asymmetries between a firm and its employees affect the firm’s
choice of employee benefits and employee’s choice of nature of task to perform.
We first study the problem faced by a research employee when choosing whether
to pursue an innovative idea as part of his employment at a firm or to form a
start-up. We characterize an idea by its stand-alone value and by the degree of
(positive or negative) externality that it may impose on the employing firm’s ex-
isting profits if brought to market. Internal exploration, while allowing the em-
ployee to take advantage of any exploration support offered by the firm, reduces
the employee’s claim over his idea. We find that external exploration takes place
for ideas weakly related to the firm’s existing product line, with other ideas being
explored internally. Knowledge of employee’s exploration strategy allows us to
study the firm’s decision to offer support for exploration. We show that if the firm
increases its support for exploration, it can induce the internal research of a wider
range of ideas; however, by doing so, it also increases the likelihood of employees
departing to pursue independent ventures at a later stage of development. We
further show that as the firm’s bargaining position for capturing proceeds from
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innovations vis-a`-vis employees strengthens, the firm’s optimal level of support
increases, and consequently its profits may decline. This happens because firm’s
stronger bargaining position makes internal exploration less attractive to the em-
ployee and he requires a higher level of support to remain with the firm.
Chapters 3 and 4 focus on information asymmetries in credit markets. Despite
being highly competitive in nature, information asymmetries prevent the bor-
rowers from benefiting from it. While some borrowers are denied loans (Stiglitz
and Weiss, 1981), others experience high and sticky interest rates on their loans
(Ausubel, 1991). In their attempts to make more informed decisions, lenders rely
extensively on credit reports and scores provided by the credit bureaus. These
credit scores are based on a range of information including borrowers’ past mort-
gage payments, rent and other payments, existing credit mix, past bankruptcies,
public records, recent credit inquiries, etc.. In Chapter 3, we analyze how us-
ing information beyond the borrowers’ repayment history affects the credit mar-
ket. The interaction between the borrowers and lenders is modeled as a dynamic
game of incomplete information. We find that borrowers’ optimal behavior is to
repay their loans as long as their rating exceeds a threshold value. Further, this
threshold increases if the future lenders are expected to use information beyond
repayment history as it reduces the future costs of defaults. However, it hastens
the discovery of the borrower’s true type and results in more immediate screen-
ing. We recommend that, in order to minimize defaults, more repayment history
based products should be offered by the lenders as they would reduce the moral
hazard experienced by the borrower.
This recommendation made in Chapter 3 is tested in Chapter 4, coauthored
with Vijetha Koppa, using data from Prosper Marketplace Inc. - an online peer-
to-peer lending market. On August 16, 2007, their registered members were in-
2
formed that while borrower’s repayment activity in this market was already being
reported to Experian, it would now also be reported to TransUnion. This pol-
icy change increased the penalties for defaults for borrowers. Using this policy
change as a natural experiment, we analyze the impact of this change on future
default rates. Comparing high risk borrowers with low risk borrowers reveals
that, in the pre-change period, the default rates of high risk borrowers were 9 to
11 percentage points higher and internal rates of return were 13 percentage points
lower. Ceteris paribus, this result is suggestive of the presence of moral hazard
in this market and reinforces the recommendation made in Chapter 3 of offering
more repayment history based products in the market.
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2. THE 80/20 RULE: A FIRM’S CHOICE OF SUPPORT FOR THE
EXPLORATION OF NEW IDEAS
2.1 Introduction
Evidence indicates that innovations developed by start-ups were often con-
ceived by former employees of established firms, who undertook projects that
had been overlooked by their employers (Bhide, 1994). These innovations are
frequently closely related to the respective parent firms’ lines of business. For in-
stance, FriendFeed, Aardvark, and Nextstop were all start-ups founded by former
Google employees and are closely connected to Internet search.1
While innovations may eventually be developed outside of the parent firm,
the initial exploration often occurs within. In fact, many of the firms that bear a
reputation for employees departing to form start-ups, also have in place gener-
ous policies for supporting the exploration of new ideas. Firms such as 3M and
Google pioneered generous company policies for allowing employees to explore
new ideas “on the company’s dime.” Google specifically states the following in
the recruiting section of its website:2
“We offer our engineers ‘20-percent time’ so that they’re free to work on what they’re
really passionate about. Google Suggest, AdSense for Content, and Orkut are among the
many products of this perk.”
A firm’s choice to support and encourage exploration by its employees in lieu
of negotiating exploration-contingent contracts can be understood in light of the
1Numerous other start-ups that bear a relationship to Google’s product line were founded by
former Google employees, including Ooyala, Dasient, TellApart, Cuil, Redbeacon, Mixer Labs,
Howcast, MyLikes, Weatherbill, Doapp, reMail, Hawthorne Labs, and AppJet, among others.
2http://www.google.com/intl/en/jobs/lifeatgoogle/englife/index.html
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nature of the innovation process. Innovative ideas are frequently the result of
unpredictable and non-contractible initiatives, which go beyond employees’ nor-
mally prescribed tasks (Hellmann and Thiele, 2011). Thus, incentive contracts
based on measurable performance objectives studied in the literature (e.g., Holm-
stro¨m and Milgrom, 1991; Gibbons, 1998) are often hard to structure and evaluate
in practice.
Google’s 80/20 “Innovation Time Off” (ITO) policy, encouraging its engineers
to take 20 percent of their time to work on company-related projects of their choos-
ing, has led to some exceptionally successful products, including Gmail, AdSense,
and Google News. 3M’s analogous innovation model, which dates back to the
1950s,3 has famously led to the development of the Masking Tape and Post-It
Notes. This type of corporate innovation governance has been both formally and
informally adopted in organizations ranging from high schools4 to other technol-
ogy firms.5 Depending on a firm’s specific policies, taking advantage of ITO may
require obtaining a supervisor’s approval, pursuing formal projects, and record-
ing and regularly updating progress in a project-planning database. Hence, the
degree to which information about an idea can be accessed by supervisors may
vary across organizations.
While Google’s ITO policy has attracted considerable media and practitioner
attention in recent years, the literature has largely ignored the dynamics behind
such corporate innovation policies. This paper aims to fill in this gap in the lit-
erature by offering an integrated model to (i) study a firm’s choice of support for
innovation, and (ii) examine the decision faced by employees of the firm in terms
3http://multimedia.3m.com/mws/mediawebserver?6666660Zjcf6lVs6EVs666IMhCOrrrrQ-
4http://www.centerdigitaled.com/training/Googles-8020-Principle-New-Jersey-School.
html
5http://blogs.atlassian.com/2008/03/20_time_experiment/
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of whether to pursue new ideas within the firm or as start-ups. In examining how
an employee might respond to a firm’s offer of exploration support, we are also
able to uncover some of the forces behind start-up formation.
Since employees are encouraged to explore ideas that are related to their em-
ployers’ lines of business, new ideas that are brought to market may interact with
employers’ existing products and profits. Accordingly, an integral component of
our model is to allow for such profit interactions. On the employee’s side, we
characterize what types of ideas, in terms of their relationship to the employer’s
existing products, are more likely to be kept within the firm versus pursued as
start-ups. In particular, we show how a firm’s chosen level of support may in-
teract with the likelihood and the timing of an employee’s departure to form a
start-up. On the firm’s side, we study how its institutional framework and the
level of market competitiveness interact with its choice of exploration support.
Consistent with the literature [e.g., Rogers (2003)], a new idea in our frame-
work can be turned into a marketable innovation in two stages, exploration and
development. A firm’s support for exploration affects an employee’s initial choice
of whether to explore a new idea internally or externally as a start-up. From the
employee’s point of view, external exploration has the advantage of a higher ap-
propriability of the innovation. The benefit of internal exploration is twofold.
First, the employee can take advantage of any support offered by the firm. Sec-
ond, internal exploration and handling of an idea may lead to a positive synergy
surplus being shared between the firm and the employee.
As indicated above, a defining feature of our model is that ideas conceived
by employees interact with their employers’ existing lines of business, and thus
have the potential to complement or compete with their employers’ current offer-
ings. Internal handling of an idea can enhance the value of complementary ideas
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and reduce the profit-eroding effects of substitute ideas, and thus is often effi-
cient. However, negotiations between an innovating employee and the firm over
the allocation of proceeds from a subsequent innovation are not always success-
ful. Disagreements between the firm and an employee in our model take place
due to the firm’s limited information regarding the employee’s entrepreneurial
ability, which can result in an unsatisfactory allocation of proceeds. In turn, a
downstream start-up formation may occur when an employee possesses both a
high-valued idea and the requisite entrepreneurial ability to pursue a new ven-
ture.
Our model gives rise to the prediction that firms would tend to bleed out ideas
that are weakly related to their current offerings, while ideas that are strongly re-
lated are handled internally — either developed inside the firm (for complements)
or shelved (substitutes). Conditional on internal exploration, strongly comple-
mentary and substitute ideas tend to generate high bargaining surplus from in-
ternal handling. In turn, the firm is more willing to compensate an innovating
employee for keeping these ideas within the firm. In contrast, the firm is less con-
cerned about losing ideas that exhibit weak externalities — ideas which are also
characterized by a low level of bargaining surplus.
From the perspective of an employee, it thus follows that the more likely an
idea is to interact with the firm’s existing line of business, the higher the em-
ployee’s expected payoff from exploring the idea within the firm. When choosing
to explore a new idea inside the firm, the employee weighs the cost of reduced ap-
propriability and the potential benefit of sharing additional surplus from internal
handling of an idea. Since this latter benefit is higher for ideas exhibiting stronger
externalities, for a given level of support, the firm tends to induce the internal
exploration of strong complements and substitutes, and bleeds out ideas that are
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weakly related to its line of business.
As the level of exploration support that is offered by a firm increases, more
ideas are explored (at their initial stage) inside the firm. Interestingly, this also
increases the likelihood of disagreements in the development stage, as it becomes
increasingly difficult for the firm to distinguish between employees with low and
high entrepreneurial abilities. This finding is consistent with the anecdotal ev-
idence mentioned above, where firms which are most supportive of employee
exploration, such as Google, are also renowned for their employees’ leaving to
form new ventures.
Having pinned down the effects of a firm’s support for exploration on an em-
ployee’s innovation strategy, we next examine the firm’s initial choice of how
much support to offer. In particular, we characterize how the firm’s optimal level
of support and expected profits are affected by changes in the firm’s bargaining
position and by changes in the competitive landscape. We show that the firm’s
optimal level of support rises as the firm is able to appropriate higher shares of
the proceeds from newly developed ideas. This is because employees expect a
less favorable outcome in the downstream, and are subsequently more likely to
explore new ideas externally—unless the firm increases its level of support. We
further show that the firm’s profit may subsequently decrease because the cost
of maintaining the flow of ideas can outweigh the gains in appropriating larger
downstream proceeds.
2.1.1 Related literature
There is a significant body of literature that addresses different aspects of in-
novation in firms. A number of papers have analyzed the selection, management,
and financing of innovation activities (e.g., Aghion and Tirole, 1994; Bernardo
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et al., 2008). The question of why established firms are unable to attract and re-
tain profitable ideas has been on the forefront of the entrepreneurship literature
in the last decade. Some explanations for start-up formation include informa-
tion asymmetries and overly optimistic employees (Amador and Landier, 2003,
Thompson and Chen, 2011); expropriation concerns due to either lack of commit-
ment by the established firm or weak property rights (Anton and Yao, 1994; Anton
and Yao, 1995; Wiggins, 1995); non-monetary benefits of exploration for the em-
ployee (Hellmann, 2007); know-how acquisition by employees increasing their en-
trepreneurship potential (Franco and Filson, 2006); inability of the established firm
to prevent the development of profit-eroding innovations (Klepper and Sleeper,
2005); and limited capacity for internal ventures (Cassiman and Ueda, 2006). Our
paper is closest to the literature that accounts for start-ups using informational
asymmetries. The established firm in our model has both limited information
about the value of conceived ideas by employees as well as the employees’ en-
trepreneurial abilities, both of which impact employees’ incentives for start-up
formation.
While existing work has successfully accounted for an employee’s decision to
become an entrepreneur, there are still limited insights about the firm’s incentives
to support innovation. Our paper aims to shed light onto the underlying fun-
damentals that affect a firm’s willingness to support exploration by employees,
as well as the effects of increased exploration support on start-up formation. In
this respect, our paper is related to Hellmann and Thiele (2011), who, similarly
to our approach, develop a multi-tasking model. In their setting, a firm can in-
fluence an employee’s incentives for exploration by appropriately designing his
compensation structure. However, their model does not explicitly account for the
possibility of an innovation interacting with the firm’s existing line of products,
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which is a significant determinant of the firm’s choice of exploration support in
our framework.
The contribution of our paper is two-fold. First, since we view the choices of
(i) exploration support by the firm, and (ii) start-up formation by employees, as
inextricably interrelated, we present an integrated model that can successfully ac-
count for both phenomena. Second, in line with empirical evidence which shows
that start-up activities are closely related to the parent firm (Klepper, 2009), we
allow for the possibility of both complementary and substitute innovations. This
allows us to study how innovation externalities affect both the level of exploration
support as well as the likelihood of start-up formation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 formally sets
up the model. Section 2.3 and 2.4 solve for expected payoffs from internal explo-
ration and characterize the employee’s optimal exploration strategy for a given
level of exploration support by the firm. Section 2.5 addresses how the likeli-
hood and timing of an employee’s new venture formation is affected by the firm’s
choice of support and by the firm’s prior beliefs that employees have high en-
trepreneurship abilities. Section 2.6 characterizes the optimal level of support and
derives comparative statics on parameters that interact with the firm’s choice of
support. Section 2.7 concludes. All the proofs are relegated to Appendix A of this
dissertation.
2.2 Model
Our model consists of a firm ( f ) and a research employee (e). The researcher
receives a competitive wage, w, to work on the firm’s core task. In the course of
his work, the researcher may serendipitously come up with an innovative idea
characterized by a stand-alone valuation, vi, and an externality, ∆, that is imposed
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on the firm’s profit. The stand-alone valuation is drawn from a Bernoulli distri-
bution taking a high value vi = v with probability ψ and a low value vi = 0 with
probability 1−ψ. The externality imposed on the firm is drawn from a conditional
distribution F(∆|vi)with support [∆,∆], allowing for both positive (a complemen-
tary idea) or negative (a substitute idea) externalities.
Aware of the employee’s innovation potential, the firm can choose to encour-
age internal exploration by providing the employee with exploration support, de-
noted by L. The firms’ support includes benefits that affect both the employee’s
exploration success (productivity effect) as well as his satisfaction of being em-
ployed (retention effect). For example, the firm may offer free time on the com-
pany’s dime, which can affect both the employee’s ability to work on new ideas as
well as his overall satisfaction with his job. The productivity effect, p(L), captures
the probability of successful exploration and satisfies p′(L) > 0 and p′′(L) < 0.
The retention effect, u(L), captures the impact of the firm’s support on the em-
ployee’s happiness that is not related to his productivity. We normalize u(0) = 0
and assume that u′(L) > 0 and u′′(L) ≤ 0.
The firm’s exploration support affects the employee’s decision of how to han-
dle his conceived ideas. The employee’s choice and subsequent game is depicted
by Figure 2.1. Upon coming up with an idea, the researcher faces three options:
completely ignore the idea and focus on the core task (denoted by C), explore the
idea externally via a start-up (denoted by E), and explore the idea internally (de-
noted by I). The first option of ignoring the idea and focusing on the core task
results in a payoff of w + u(L). The payoff from choosing the second option of
external exploration via a start-up depends on the stand-alone value of the idea
vi, the expected probability of success outside the firm, given by p0, and the re-
searcher’s privately observed entrepreneurial ability β, which determines his role
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Firm chooses support for internal innovation L
Employee comes up with an idea
Core Task Only
Ignore
(−L,w+ L)
Explore internally
Internal
Negotiate over surplus
Joint handling
Split pi J
Disagreements
(piof − L,pioe + L)
Explore externally
External
Development
(piEf ,pi
E
e )
1
Figure 2.1: Timing of the game
and thus his payoff from a potential start-up.6 The expected probability of suc-
cess depends on the market conditions such as availability of venture capital and
exploration support outside the firm. We assume that the firm and the employee
have a common belief about the market conditions summarized by p0. We allow
for high and low entrepreneurial ability where β ∈ {βL, βH} with 1 ≥ βH > βL
reflects the share of the start-up profit captured to the employee. The employee is
privately informed about his entrepreneurship ability. The firm’s prior belief that
the employee is of high ability is denoted by q ∈ (0, 1). Thus, the employee’s ex-
pected payoff from external exploration is piEe (vi, β) = p0βvi while the firm simply
experiences the externality piEf (vi,∆) = p0∆1(vi = v).
The third option of internal exploration enables the employee to take advan-
tage of the firm’s exploration support L, but it also reveals the idea to the firm.
6For simplicity, we assume that the employee enjoys full appropriability of the idea when
explored and developed independently. Extending the model to imperfect appropriability is
straightforward and preserves the qualitative features of the model.
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With probability (1 − p(L)) exploration fails to deliver a useful innovation re-
sulting in a base wage payment of w for the employee and a status quo for the
firm (which is normalized to 0). With probability p(L), exploration is successful,
giving rise to two possibilities. First, the employee and the firm can negotiate a
mutually beneficial agreement for internal handling of the idea leading to a joint
payoff of pi J(vi,∆) = max{g∆∆+ vi, 0}, where g∆ = gs∆ < 1 for substitutes and
g∆ = gc∆ > 1 for complements. This payoff reflects the fact that combing the
expertise of the two parties allows for management of the externalities in a way
that generates the most surplus. This entails tailoring the new product in a way
that fits the existing firm’s products better, i.e. gc∆ > 1 and g
s
∆ < 1, or shelving it
whenever optimal. As a result, joint handling of the idea is always the efficient
outcome.
The second possibility stemming from internal exploration is an independent
development of the idea by the two parties. In this case, a share α f vi of the
stand-alone value of the idea goes to the firm and αevi goes to the start-up where
α f + αe ≤ 1 captures the profit-eroding effect of competition as well as the po-
tential loss of surplus due to property rights dispute. As a result, the employee’s
payoff becomes pioe (vi, β, αe) = βαevi, which is lower than his payoff from suc-
cessful external exploration. The firm’s payoff from independent development
is piof (vi,∆, α f ) = (α f vi + ∆)1(vi = v) + max{0,∆}(1 − 1(vi = v)), where 1(·)
denotes the indicator function. These payoffs reflect the fact that the start-up de-
velops only valuable ideas, while the firm may develop ideas with no stand-alone
value if those ideas are complementary. We assume that for either type of em-
ployee external exploration and development of valuable ideas is more attractive
than the core task (i.e., max{p0, αe}βv ≥ w), which implies that the employee has
a credible threat to develop these ideas without the firm. External exploration
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in our model is driven by the firm’s inability to evaluate employee’s ideas and
entrepreneurship ability before ideas are explored.
The negotiation between the firm and the employee for internal handling of
the idea is modeled as a random-proposer bargaining game with γ denoting the
probability of the firm making a take-it-or-leave-it offer. The parameter γ can
represent policies that the firm puts in place for negotiating proceeds from inter-
nally explored ideas.7 From the perspective of employees, 1 − γ can represent
an employee’s ability to negotiate for a portion of the surplus from an internally-
explored idea.
We solve for the Perfect-Bayesian equilibrium of this game by first analyz-
ing the negotiation subgame following internal exploration, and then finding the
expected payoffs for the firm and the employee from internal exploration. This
allows us to determine the level of support that induces internal development
of ideas with parameters (∆, vi). Then, by weighing in the costs and benefits of
widening the spectrum of ideas that are brought in for internal exploration, we
can characterize the firm’s optimal level of support.
2.3 Internal Exploration: Negotiation Subgame
The negotiation subgame will determine what ideas are likely to be retained by
the firm after initial internal exploration. In this stage, the firm and the employee
bargain over the internal handling of the successfully explored idea. Recall that
internal exploration reveals the idea to the firm. However, the employee is still
privately informed about his entrepreneurship ability. Thus, disagreements may
arise if the firm fails to compensate the high entrepreneurial employee sufficiently
to prevent departure. Naturally, the firm’s willingness to pay in order to retain
7We consider the possibility of γ being determined endogenously at the outset of the game in
Section 6 and examine how the firm’s and employee’s payoff is affected by γ.
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the employee depends both on the value of the idea as well as his belief regarding
the employee’s entrepreneurship ability. Note that this belief may be different
from the prior q since the employee’s choice of internal exploration may serve
as a signal regarding his type. Let θI denote the firm’s posterior belief that the
employee is of high type (i.e., β = βH), conditional on his idea being explored
internally. The following Proposition characterizes the type of ideas that are likely
to result in external development.
Proposition 1 The firm and the researcher fail to reach an agreement with positive prob-
ability γθI if and only if vi = v, and ∆ ∈ (∆L(v, θI),∆H(v, θI)), where ∆L(v, θI)
(∆H(v, θI)) is increasing (decreasing) in θI and ∆L(v, θI) = ∆H(v, θI) = 0 for θI ≥
(βH−βL)αe
1−α f−βLαe ∈ (0, 1).
Proposition 1 states that the firm may fail to reach an agreement with high-
ability employees when their ideas have high stand-alone values and are only
weakly related to the firm’s existing line of business. To glean some insight into
this result, let us consider the case of complementary ideas. A weakly comple-
mentary idea adds little to the firm’s existing profit. Thus, the firm makes a low
compensation offer of βLαev to the researcher, which is subsequently rejected if
the researcher has a high entrepreneurial ability. As the complementarity of the
idea strengthens, the firm has more to lose from failing to reach an agreement
and increases its offer to βHαev, which in turn is accepted by both types. Further,
the disagreement region [0,∆H(v, θI)] shrinks as the firm’s belief of facing a high
type increases, since the firm’s expected payoff from making a low compensation
offer decreases. This induces the firm to increase its offer for a wider range of
complementary ideas, effectively reducing disagreements.
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The intuition for substitute ideas is similar. In this case, the firm is concerned
about losing ideas that would result in substantial profit erosion if developed ex-
ternally. Thus, the firm is willing to make a high compensation offer whenever
faced with an idea that exhibits a large negative externality. As the likelihood of
facing a high-ability employee increases, the firm in turn increases its offer on a
wider range of substitute ideas. Proposition 1 also notes that there exists a cut-off
value for the firm’s posterior belief θI , given by
(βH−βL)αe
1−α f−βLαe < 1, such that no ideas
are lost in the downstream for beliefs at or above this cutoff.
Armed with the equilibrium characterization of the negotiation stage, we can
calculate the firm’s and the employee’s expected payoffs, which are important
determinants of the incentives for internal exploration by the employee and the
firm’s exploration support in the earlier stages of the game. The following Corol-
lary describes how these payoffs are affected by the degree of externality, ∆.
Corollary 1 Let piNf (vi,∆, θI) and pi
N
e (vi,∆, β, θI) denote the firm’s and the employee’s
expected payoff from the negotiation stage.
1. If ∆ > 0, then piNf (vi,∆, θI) is strictly increasing and pi
N
e (vi,∆, β, θI) is (weakly)
increasing in ∆.
2. If ∆ < 0, then
a) piNf (0,∆, θI) and pi
N
e (0,∆, β, θI) are independent of ∆.
b) piNf (v,∆, θI) is strictly increasing in ∆ while pi
N
e (v,∆, β, θI) is strictly de-
creasing in ∆.
It follows from Corollary 1 that independent of the value of an idea, the em-
ployee and the firm both benefit from strong complementarity. This is a direct
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consequence of the value-enhancing property of internal development of comple-
mentary ideas (i.e., gc∆ > 1). As the magnitude of the externality rises, the bar-
gaining surplus pi J − piof − pioe and the firm’s outside option piof increase, leading
both the firm’s and the employee’s internal payoffs to increase as well.
For substitute ideas, the employee benefits from a credible threat of imposing
a stronger negative externality to the firm since it increases the firm’s eagerness to
retain the idea in-house. If the idea has a low stand-alone value, the employee is
unable to credibly commit to develop the idea and thus the bargaining surplus is
0. In contrast, for high-value ideas, vi = v, external development is feasible and
the bargaining surplus is decreasing in ∆ since a weaker substitute idea constitutes
less of a threat to the firm’s existing profit. As a result, the firm’s expected payoff
is increasing in ∆ and the employee’s expected payoff is decreasing in ∆.
Overall, corollary 1 reveals that the employee benefits more from ideas that
impose stronger externalities on the firm. This, in turn, implies that the employee
requires weaker incentives to bring such ideas in-house. We next study the opti-
mal exploration strategy by the researcher.
2.4 Optimal Exploration Strategy
In this stage, the employee with an innovative idea observes the level of sup-
port offered by the firm and chooses either to ignore the idea (C), explore inter-
nally (I) or pursue the idea outside the firm (E). The payoff from ignoring the
idea is given by piCe (L) = w + u(L). His payoff from exploring the idea internally
is pi Ie(vi,∆, β, θI , L) = p(L)piNe + (1− p(L))w + u(L) and external exploration re-
sults in piEe (vi, β) = p0βvi. The employee chooses the exploration strategy that
leads to the highest possible payoff. We assume that whenever indifferent, the
researcher breaks the indifference in favor of ignoring the idea over exploring as
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well as exploring internally over externally.8
Low valued ideas are never explored outside the firm and thus the employee
chooses either to ignore them or explore them internally. Moreover, we know
from the negotiation’s stage that the employee benefits from exploring low valued
ideas only if they add substantial value to the firm. Therefore, the employee will
explore only ideas that are sufficiently complementary and ignore the rest.
In contrast, high valued ideas are always profitable to explore either internally
or externally. From Corollary 1, we know that the employee’s downstream payoff
is increasing in the degree of externality that the idea is imposing on the firm. As a
result, strongly complementary or substitute ideas will require lower powered in-
centives in order to induce internal exploration. Moreover, the low entrepreneur-
ship type has lower outside option for any realization of ∆ and thus should be
more willing to bring an idea inside the firm. The following Proposition formal-
izes this intuition.
Proposition 2 For a given L, if vi = 0, both employee types choose to ignore the idea if
∆ ≤ wgc∆−1 = ∆
∗
c (L, 0, β) and explore internally otherwise. If vi = v, there exist cutoffs
∆∗s (L, v, βH) ≤ ∆∗s (L, v, βL) ≤ 0 that are increasing in L and 0 ≤ ∆∗c (L, v, βL) ≤
∆∗c (L, v, βH) that are decreasing in L, such that:
a) If ∆ /∈ (∆∗s (L, v, βH),∆∗c (L, v, βH)), both types explore internally and θ∗I = q.
b) If ∆ ∈ (∆∗s (L, v, βH),∆∗s (L, v, βL)) or ∆ ∈ (∆∗c (L, v, βL),∆∗c (L, v, βH)) a high-
type employee explores externally, a low-type explores internally, and θ∗I = 0.
c) If ∆ ∈ (∆∗s (L, v, βL),∆∗c (L, v, βL)), both types explore externally and θ∗I = 0.
8Such tie breaking rule is in favor of efficiency whenever exploration is costly. For simplicity,
we abstract from a costly exploration effort since it results in similar qualitative results as the ones
presented here.
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Proposition 2 confirms that ideas with a low outside option are explored in-
ternally only if they sufficiently complement the firm’s existing products since
these are the ideas that generate sufficient bargaining surplus to justify their ex-
ploration. In contrast, if the conceived idea has a high outside option, both strong
complements and substitutes are explored in-house. This is because the employee
has a credible threat of external development, allowing him to benefit from explor-
ing ideas that impose a high negative externality to the firm.
Proposition 2 states that strongly complementary or substitute ideas are ex-
plored internally by both types, preventing the buyer from updating her prior
regarding the employee’s entrepreneurship type. Since the low type of employee
is more eager to explore in-house, ideas with intermediate levels of externality are
explored internally only by the low type of employee, causing him to perfectly re-
veal his type to the firm. Finally, ideas that are weakly related to the firm’s line of
business are explored externally by both types. The off-equilibrium belief by the
buyer that the employee has a low entrepreneurship ability in this case prevents
the low type from deviating and exploring internally.
Combining the findings from Propositions 1 and 2, if follows that researchers
who leave their employment to form start-ups do so to pursue high-value ideas
that are weakly related to the firm’s line of business. Moreover, a researcher may
choose to exit the firm either at the initial exploration stage or at the downstream
development stage. The next section examines how the level of support by the
firm affect both the likelihood and the timing of a researcher’s potential departure
to form a start-up.
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2.5 Timing of the Researcher’s Departure
The level of support offered by the firm helps determine whether the employee
pursues internal exploration. It is intuitive that a higher level of support results
in increased exploration activity within the firm. Proposition 1 points out, how-
ever, that the firm will not always be able to retain the ideas that are explored in-
house if it is unable to screen out the employee’s entrepreneurial ability and offer
a sufficient amount of compensation. As the following proposition reveals, while
increasing support induces further in-house exploration, doing so may also result
in a higher rate of disagreements in the downstream, as it becomes increasingly
difficult for the firm to distinguish between high- and low-ability employees.
Proposition 3 The likelihood of internal exploration is (weakly) increasing in L. For
q ≥ (βH−βL)αe1−α f−βLαe , no downstream disagreements occur. For q <
(βH−βL)αe
1−α f−βLαe , there exists L˜
such that for L > L˜ the likelihood of downstream disagreements is increasing in L.
An increase in L makes internal exploration more attractive for both employee
types. Thus, ∆∗s (L, v, β) is increasing in L and ∆∗c (L, v, β) is decreasing in L, ef-
fectively reducing the range of ideas explored outside the firm. The likelihood
of downstream disagreement depends on the firm’s ability to distinguish the em-
ployee’s entrepreneurial ability. Proposition 3 states that if a high type is suffi-
ciently likely (i.e., q ≥ (βH−βL)αe1−α f−βLαe ) , then this is not an issue, since the firm always
finds it optimal to make a generous offer in the downstream that is acceptable to
both employee types. For q < (βH−βL)αe1−α f−βLαe , however, the firm may choose to make
a low price offer if the idea is weakly related to the firm’s existing products and
it is sufficiently likely that the employee is of low entrepreneurship ability. This
will not cause disagreements for low levels of support since the firm will lose
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the high entrepreneurship employee in the exploration stage, allowing it to per-
fectly screen out the employee’s type for a wide range of weakly related ideas
∆ ∈ (∆∗s (L, v, βH),∆∗c (L, v, βH)). As L increases, however, exploration becomes
more attractive for the high entrepreneurship employee. As a result, the firm
may fail to reach an agreement for moderate complements or substitutes, i.e., for
∆ ∈ (∆∗L(v, q),∆∗s (L, v, βH)) or ∆ ∈ (∆∗c (L, v, βH),∆∗H(v, q)). This occurs because
the low likelihood of a high type and the moderate externality make it optimal
for the firm to make a low offer in the downstream negotiation. As L increases,
the region of downstream disagreements expands, as the high-type’s choice of ex-
ploring more ideas in-house makes it harder for the firm to distinguish between
the two types.
From the above, it follows that the firm may never be able to implement an
exploration-support strategy that eliminates inefficient departures by employees.
Interestingly, all else being equal, our findings predict that firms with higher level
of exploration support are also the ones that will experience more disagreements
and loss of ideas initially explored in-house. This is consistent with anecdotal
evidence from highly innovative firms, such as Google, that are known for their
generous exploration support policies, as well as for their high rates of employee
departures to pursue new ventures.
2.6 Optimal Support for Exploration
Having identified the characteristics and timing of the departure of ideas, we
focus on the firm’s choice of exploration support. At the time of setting its sup-
port, the firm has limited information about the characteristics of the ideas that
are likely to emerge. Hence, its decision is based only on its prior belief about
the value of the conceived ideas as well as the entrepreneurship ability of the em-
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ployee.
The firm’s exploration support affects both the employee’s willingness to pur-
sue internal exploration as well as the likelihood of successful exploration. The
firm’s expected payoff from internal exploration of an idea characterized by (∆, vi,
β) is pi If (vi,∆, β, L) = p(L)pi
N
f (vi,∆, θ
∗
I ) while its payoff from external exploration
is given by piEf (vi,∆). Thus, the firm’s surplus of inducing internal exploration of
an idea with characteristics (vi,∆, β) is S f (vi,∆, β, L) = pi If (vi,∆, β, L)−piEf (vi,∆).
By Proposition 2, for high valued ideas, this surplus is realized only if the idea is
close enough to the existing firm’s products (i.e., ∆ /∈ (∆∗s (L, v, β) ,∆∗c (L, v, β))).
If the idea has a low stand-alone value, internal exploration takes place for ideas
with strong positive externality. Letting ∆s (L, 0, β) = ∆, this implies that inter-
nal exploration of low value ideas occurs for ∆ /∈ (∆∗s (L, 0, β) ,∆∗c (L, 0, β)). Then,
in the first period, the firm choice of exploration support is represented by the
following optimization problem.
max
L
E
[
S f (vi,∆, β, L) |∆ /∈ (∆∗s ,∆∗c ) , vi, β
]− (2.1)
L
(
1− Pr (v) (F (∆∗c |v)− F (∆∗s |v))
)
Equation 2.1 simply states that the firm maximizes its expected surplus from in-
ternal exploration minus the expected expenditure on exploration support. Note
that the firm incurs L only if the employee chooses to stay within the firm either
to explore an innovative idea of work on the core task. The first order condition
characterizing the optimal level of support is given by:
E
[
∂S f (vi,∆, β, L)
∂L
|∆ /∈ (∆∗s ,∆∗c ) , vi, β
]
+ (2.2)
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E[S f (vi,∆∗s , β, L) f (∆∗s |vi)
d∆∗s
dL
, vi, β]− E[S f (vi,∆∗c , β, L) f (∆∗c |vi)
d∆∗c
dL
, vi, β]
= 1− Pr (v) [F (∆∗c |v)− F (∆∗s |v)] + L Pr (v)
[
f (∆∗c |v)
d∆∗c
dL
− f (∆∗s |v)
d∆∗s
dL
]
At the optimum, the firm equates the marginal benefit and cost of exploration
support. The marginal benefit of internal exploration includes an increase in the
likelihood of success from internal exploration, captured by the first term in equa-
tion (2.2), and the increase in the employee’s willingness to pursue ideas inter-
nally, captured by the second term in equation (2.2). The marginal cost of internal
exploration includes the cost of increasing support for employees that are already
successfully retained and the additional cost associated with the higher retention
likelihood.
The optimality condition given by equation (2.2) allows us to study how the
optimal level of support and the profitability of internal exploration is affected by
the fundamentals of our model. The next section discusses the effect of the firm
and the employee’s bargaining power, captured by γ, and the market and legal
environment, captured by αe and α f , on the firm’s support for exploration.
2.6.1 Changes in optimal level of support
The firm’s bargaining position in the downstream negotiation with the em-
ployee depends on various factors such as the firm’s control over the develop-
ment process, the importance of the employee’s expertise in the successful devel-
opment of the product, and the institutional and legal framework within which
negotiations take place. Some of these factors are within the firm’s control, as they
are impacted by the firm’s organizational structure. For instance, a more hierar-
chical organizational structure tend to tilt the bargaining power in favor of the
firm, while a flatter structure gives more autonomy to employees. The following
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Proposition states that a higher bargaining power by the firm is associated with a
greater support for exploration.
Proposition 4 The firm’s optimal level of exploration support L∗(γ) is increasing in γ.
The increase in the firm’s bargaining power has a two-fold effect. First, it in-
creases the firm’s surplus from internal exploration, which makes the firm more
eager to support the pursuit of new ideas by the employees. Second, it makes the
employees less willing to remain within the firm whenever they conceive a valu-
able idea. This causes the firm to increase its support further in order to ensure
internal exploration.
While increasing the firm’s bargaining power in the downstream clearly makes
the firm more eager to support exploration, such change may sometimes ad-
versely affect the firm’s profitability. A ceteris-paribus increase in the firm’s bar-
gaining power, γ, has a positive effect on the firm’s profitability. However, γ also
affects the employee’s willingness to pursue internal exploration. As a result, the
firm not only loses the surplus generated by the marginal ideas, but also incurs
a higher cost on the ideas that remain inside the firm. As the following exam-
ple illustrates, the negative strategic effect on firm’s profits through fewer ideas
being explored internally could dominate the direct positive effect of the higher
bargaining power.
Example 2 The stand-alone value of the idea is vi = 500 with probability 0.8 and vi = 0
otherwise. The productivity effect is captured by p (L) =
(
1− e−.5L−0.1) with external
success probability po = 1− e−0.1 . The retention effect is captured by u (L) = 0.3L0.9.
The externality parameter is a draw from a uniform distribution U ∼ [0, 1500] with
probability λvi =
 0.9 i f vi = 00.1 i f vi = 500 and a draw from a uniform U ∼ [−1500, 0]
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with probability 1 − λvi . Internal exploration results in gc∆ = 1.1, gs∆ = 0.9 and a
competition effect αe = 0.05 and α f = 0.9. The prior belief of the employee being of high
entrepreneurship ability is q = 0.4 with βL = 0.1 and βH = 0.9. The employee’s wage
rate from the core task is w = 0.2.
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Figure 2.2: The effect of strengthening the firm’s bargaining position.
As can be seen from Figure 2.2, an increase in γ causes the firm to increase their sup-
port in order to increase the likelihood of successful exploration and counter the negative
impact of γ on the employee’s incentives to explore internally. The firm’s profit is initially
increasing in γ, reaches the maximum around γ = 0.6 and then starts to decrease as the
negative strategic effect overwhelms the positive direct effect.
The firm’s willingness to support internal exploration is also affected by the
market conditions and the legal allocation of property rights, which are captured
by the parameters αe and α f in our model.
Proposition 5 The firm’s optimal level of exploration support L∗ is increasing in α f , and
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decreasing in αe.
This suggests that a firm could benefit from taking steps to diminish its down-
stream bargaining position by, for instance, choosing an organizational structure
that assigns greater control of new ideas to research employees. This is in line
with studies in psychology which show that firms can enhance profits by endow-
ing employees with increased autonomy in their work.
2.7 Conclusions
Our analysis reveals that researchers who leave their employment to form
start-ups tend to develop products that are weakly related to their employer’s
line of business. While increasing the level of support for exploration may be a
powerful tool to encourage internal exploration by research employees, we find
that such policies may also increase employee departure at later stages of develop-
ment. This finding is consistent with anecdotal evidence suggesting that the firms
with the most generous exploration policies are also the ones that experience a
significant number of departures by employees to form new ventures.
When choosing its optimal level of support, the firm balances the benefits of
inducing higher levels of exploration in-house with the cost of providing support.
We find that the firm’s support is higher as its bargaining position strengthens
vis-a-vis the employee when negotiating for the development of the new product.
The level of support is also likely to be higher if the anticipated ideas are likely to
be more weakly related to the existing firm’s like of business.
Future work can take on a number of directions. One fruitful direction for
future work includes a mechanism-design framework, where the firm is able to
structure roles for employees in order to make the discovery of certain innovations
more likely (e.g., innovations that are more complementary to the firm’s existing
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line of products). Another interesting question to consider is the firm’s incentives
to commit to a development strategy ex-ante in order to impact the employee’s
exploration choice.
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3. IS MORE INFORMATION ALWAYS BETTER? A CASE IN THE CREDIT
MARKETS
3.1 Introduction
Information asymmetries in the market provides incentives to the informed
players to behave opportunistically and can result in undesirable outcomes in
one-shot interactions (Akerlof (1970), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)). However,
repeated interactions can alter their incentives and encourage them to behave dif-
ferently (Kreps and Wilson (1982),Milgrom and Roberts (1982)). These repeated
interactions either take the form of one long-lived player sequentially interacting
with a series of short-lived players or two long-lived players repeatedly interact-
ing with each other. In order for them to alter the informed player’s behavior, it is
imperative that before each interaction, short-lived players (or uninformed long-
lived player) are familiar with the long lived player’s past behavior and base their
current action on that information. This requires that all the uninformed players
have unbounded memory and can freely communicate with each other. While
prevalence of computers makes it easier to satisfy the first condition, the second
one is much harder to appease.
Consider the example of consumer credit markets. A typical borrower in to-
day’s market owns a credit card from Bank A, a personal loan from Bank B, a
mortgage loan from Bank C, and so on. In this market, allowing the short-lived
players to communicate freely would imply that all the banks directly share their
private information about the repayment behavior of this borrower. However,
in US credit markets, a credit bureau like Experian, Equifax or TransUnion facili-
tates the transfer of information among all the banks. Banks report the borrower’s
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repayment behavior on their respective loans to the credit bureau, which in turn,
dissipates this information to future banks in the form of a credit report. The credit
report of a borrower contains a wider range of arguably related information like
past bankruptcies, public records, length of credit history, recent credit inquiries,
etc.. In addition to containing most of this information directly, the credit report
also contains a summary statistic (commonly known as credit score).1 This credit
score is a predictor of the repayment probabilities of loans and is a significant de-
terminant of the offered terms and conditions on the loans. The “credit score is
determined by a complex formula that takes into account over 100 different factors”2. As
a result, in making their lending decisions, future lenders utilize information be-
yond borrower’s repayment histories. Motivated by this observation, this paper
analyzes the impact of this extra information on the behavior of the players in the
credit market.
We model the credit market interactions as a dynamic game of incomplete in-
formation between a single borrower and a sequence of lenders. The borrower
repeatedly invests the borrowed money in risky projects and has private informa-
tion about the success probabilities. The outcome of the project is also privately
observed by him and affects his ability to repay his loan. The market suffers from
both adverse selection (due to ex-ante private information) and moral hazard (due
to ex-post non verifiability of the project outcome). In order to assist the unin-
formed lender in his decision, he is offered access to a rating which is indicative of
the repayment likelihood. This rating is issued by a third party who has private
access to the borrower’s repayment history and can imperfectly observe a sig-
1See http://www.experian.com/credit_report_basics/pdf/samplecreditreport.pdf for a
sample credit report and http://www.experian.com/consumer-products/credit-score.html?
intcmp=smplpdf for details on credit scores
2http://epic.org/privacy/creditscoring/#Score\%20Calculation
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nal informative of other related characteristics. Direct communication among the
lenders in different stages of the game is assumed to be prohibitively costly. Thus,
by maintaining a record of repayment behavior and providing it to the lenders in
the current stage (in the form of a rating), the rating agent facilitates the flow of
information among the lenders in different stages of game.
This paper deviates from a majority of repeated games literature by relaxing
the assumption of the presence of commitment (or behavioral) types of players.
An implication of doing so is the potential existence of an equilibrium in which
repaying today’s loans may not always result in higher continuation payoffs in
future. Or in other words, the costly choice of repaying today would not provide
any benefits (it can potentially hurt) in future. As a result, using repayment history
for making future lending decisions encourages even more defaults in current
period and defeats the purpose of using history to form future expectations.
The borrower types in our model differ from each other in terms of the proba-
bilities with which their projects fail and they are forced to default on their loans.
We find that, if the project does not fail, borrowers of all types follow a threshold
strategy in equilibrium: default for lower ratings and repay for higher ratings.
Consistent with the existing literature, we find that using behavioral history to
predict the likelihood of future repayments is beneficial as it encourages the bor-
rowers to repay their loans more often.
This paper is closely related to an emerging literature which allows the possi-
bility of a third party facilitating the exchange of information among short lived
players (e.g., Liu and Skrzypacz (2011), Doraszelski and Escobar (2012) and Ek-
mekci (2011)). Similar to these papers, we allow for the presence of another non-
strategic long run player who can observe the complete history of the game. He
alters and restricts the short run players’ access to history by either wiping the
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history after a fixed period of time (Liu (2011)), making it costly for the short run
players to access the long run player’s history in which case he might himself
choose to access only limited history, (Liu and Skrzypacz (2011)) or providing a
discrete rating for each long run player from the set of finitely possible ratings
(Doraszelski and Escobar (2012) and Ekmekci (2011)). In our model, in addition
to observing game history, the non-strategic long run player can observe a sig-
nal related to the hidden characteristics of the informed player. He then processes
this information and provides it to the short run player in the form of a continuous
rating. Consequently, the lender’s expectations about borrower’s future behavior
are now based on information other than repayment history too. We find that uti-
lizing information this extra information has a negative impact on the repayment
behavior of the borrowers as it reduces the effect of their current choice on their
continuation payoffs. These greater defaults translate to higher interest rates for
some ratings and no lending for others. As a result, the impact of this practice on
the borrower’s welfare is not clear.
Similar to Cripps et al. (2004) and Cripps et al. (2007), we find that lenders
eventually learn about the borrowers’s true type. The extra information fastens
their learning and allows them to weed out the undesirable types of borrowers
sooner than before.
Anecdotal evidence indicates that banks place a great deal of importance on
the credit score while scrutinizing loan applications and outrightly rejects appli-
cations with a not-so-good credit score. In light of our results, we recommend that
in order to maximize repayment incentives, more products based on borrower’s
repayment history should be offered in the market.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the model
and the equilibrium is characterized in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 analyzes the impact
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of information on the borrower behavior, lender behavior and his beliefs. Section
3.5 exemplifies the existence of an equilibrium where using repayment history
encourages greater defaults. Section 3.6 discusses the wider applicability of our
results. Section 3.7 concludes. All the proofs are relegated to Appendix B .
3.2 Model
3.2.1 Description
Consider a finite horizon discrete time economy consisting of three types of
risk neutral players - a borrower, a lender and a rating agency. Over time, a given
(long lived) borrower interacts with a sequence of (short lived) lenders. The short
life of the lenders captures two main features of US credit market – first, the ability
of the lenders to change the terms and conditions of an existing loan at any time
and charge higher default interest rate; and second, the prevalent competition in
the credit market where borrowers can conveniently switch among the lenders.
At the beginning of each period t, the borrower is endowed with a project
which requires an investment of $1 and yields a stochastic output, denoted by
Yb. He has no monetary endowment. The output from the project can not be
transferred intertemporally and he is dependent on external sources of funding in
each period. A funded project yields a privately observed payoff of Yb ∈ {M, 0}
to the borrower. If Yb = M, the project is a success. (Otherwise, it is a failure.) The
action space of the borrower is contingent on Yb. If Yb = M, his action space is
given by set
{
d, d
}
, where d denotes default and d denotes repayment on the loan.
Upon success, the borrower strategically chooses between default and repayment.
Otherwise, if Yb = 0, his action space is singleton set {d}, where d denotes default
on loan and he defaults non-strategically. The probability with which the project
yields Yb = M is privately known type of the borrower and is denoted by θj ∈
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{θH, θL}, where H stands for high and L stands for low. The prior belief that
θj = θH is q ∈ (0, 1). The type of the borrower remains unchanged throughout the
game. Without loss of generality, we assume θH > θL.
In each period, a continuum of identical lenders operate in a perfectly com-
petitive market.3 At the beginning of each period t, each lender is endowed with
$1 and has the option of either investing it in risk-free government bonds for a
sure return of $1 + ir f , ir f ≥ 0, or lending it to a borrower. Conditional on lend-
ing, if the borrower chooses repayment (d), the lender receives the principal and
the pre-agreed interest rate and his payoff is given by Yl = 1 + it. In contrast,
upon observing a default (d), ex-ante a lender cannot distinguish a strategic default
from a non-strategic one. However, he can costlessly and privately make use of a
punishment mechanism which can observe the true outcome of the project with
probability β and transfer borrower’s payoff Yb to him, before the borrower can
consume it, resulting in an expected payoff of Yl = βYb to him. β captures the
legal remedies available to the lenders if borrowers default on their loan. The bor-
rower is protected by limited liability and all the investment risk is borne by the
lender.
We make the following assumptions about the parameters of the model:
Assumption 1: θHβM > 1+ ir f > θLM.
The lender’s expected payoff from lending to a high type of borrower who de-
faults surely exceeds the expected payoff from lending to a low type of borrower
who repays surely. If there is complete information about borrower’s type, then
lenders always find it optimal to lend to the high type of borrower and never to
the low type of borrower. An immediate implication of this assumption is that
3Equivalently, there can be two Bertrand competitive lenders.
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β > 1+i
r f
θH M
> 0. That is, the borrowers experience non-negligible threat of punish-
ment in each stage.
Assumption 2: θLM ≥ 1.
Investing money in the projects is an optimal choice for all the borrowers. This
assumption is necessary to ensure that reputation concerns continue to discipline
θH borrower for a longer time.4
The rating agent is a non-strategic player and has four defining features reflec-
tive of the credit bureaus in US. First, he can observe the borrower’s default his-
tory, but can not identify the underlying cause – a very high interest rate, project
failure or borrower’s strategic choice. Second, he can observe an imperfectly in-
formative private signal st ∈ {sH, sL} correlated with the private information θ of
the borrower. If θ = θH (resp. θL), then a signal st = sH (resp. sL) is observed
with probability ps ∈
(
1
2 , 1
)
5. Higher values of ps correspond to more infor-
mative signals. Third, he facilitates the flow of this information among lenders
in different stages. Lastly, he processes all the available information and issues
a rating Rt ∈ [0, 1] in each period which is interpreted as the likelihood that the
borrower is of type θH and is reflective of lenders’ beliefs about the borrower’s
type.
4If θL M < 1 < θH M, then only the high type of borrower finds it optimal to invest. Hence, the
lender expects to receive a positive return only if θ = θH and interest rate equation is given by:
1 + it = βM + (
1+ir f )−RtθHβM
RtθHrtH
. If θH M < 1, then neither type of borrowers would find it optimal
to invest the borrowed money.
5If ps = 12 , then signals are completely uninformative of the true state and will not increase the
information available to the rating agent. This would correspond to the situation when no signals
are observed. If ps < 12 , then each signal si can be interpreted as informative of the borrower being
of type θj, j 6= i, where i, j ∈ {H, L}.
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3.2.2 Strategies and payoffs
3.2.2.1 Rating Agent
In issuing a rating, the rating agents looks at the entire history of observed
signals and choices till date. Let ct denote borrower’s observed choice and can
take three different values –∅ (if no lending occurs in period t), d (if default is
observed in period t) and d (if repayment is observed in period t). Then, a rating
agent’s strategy function is given by: Rt : ∪tτ=1
{
sτ, cτ−1
} → [0, 1], where c0 is ∅.
Rt is interpreted as the likelihood that the borrower is of θH type. His payoff in
each period is assumed to be independent of his strategy.
3.2.2.2 Borrower
Recall that borrower behaves strategically only if his project succeeds. Let rtj
denote the strategy of the borrower of type θj ∈ {θH, θL} at stage t. It is interpreted
as probability of repayment by him, conditional on the project’s success. Given
rating Rt and the borrower’s strategy rtj for j ∈ {H, L}, his expected payoffs are
given by:
Vj (Rt) = rtj
[
M− (1+ it)+ EVj (Rt+1|d¯)] + (3.1)(
1− rtj
) [
(1− β) M + EVj
(
Rt+1|d
)]
where Rt+1|ct denotes the realized rating in period t + 1 if the observed choice
in period t is ct ∈
{
d, d
}
and EVj (.) denotes the expected value of continua-
tion payoffs. Depending on the signal realization st ∈ {sH, sL}, Rt+1|ct can take
two values – Rt+1|ct,sj and Rt+1|ct,si 6=j where Rt+1|ct,st+1 denotes the realized rat-
ing in period t + 1 when choice ct ∈
{
d, d
}
is observed at the end of period t
and signal st+1 ∈ {sH, sL} is observed at the beginning of period t + 1. Recall
that signals are informative of the true type of the borrowers with probability ps.
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Fix j ∈ {H, L}, st+1 = sj with probability ps and st+1 = si 6=j with probability
1− ps. Then EVj
(
Rt+1|ct
)
= psEVj
(
Rt+1|ct,sj
)
+ (1− ps) EVj
(
Rt+1|ct,si 6=j
)
. If the
borrower chooses repayment (d) – which happens with probability rtj – he receives
M− (1+ it) in the current stage and EVj
(
Rt+1|d¯
)
in the future stages. Otherwise,
if he chooses default (d) – which happens with probability 1 − rtj – he receives
(1− β) M in the current stage and EVj
(
Rt+1|d
)
in the future stages.
Let lt be a binary choice variable which takes value 1 if the money is lent and
0 otherwise. Then, for the realized rating Rt+1, expected value of future continu-
ation payoffs is given by:
EVj (Rt+1) ≡
[
θjVj (Rt+1) +
(
1− θj
)
EVj
(
Rt+2|d
)]
1
(
lt+1 = 1
)
+
EVj
(
Rt+2|∅
)
1
(
lt+1 = 0
)
Positive gains can occur only if lending takes place in a period . Suppose, lend-
ing does takes places and the project is a success – which happens with probability
θj– then borrower’s payoffs are same as in equation (3.1). On the other hand, if
either project fails or no lending takes place, the borrower receives no payoffs in
current stage and EVj
(
Rt+2|ct
)
for ct ∈ {d,∅} in future. A borrower’s optimal
strategy in stage t is given by:
rtj ∈ arg max
rtj∈[0,1]
Vj (Rt) s.t. EVj (RT+1) = 0
3.2.2.3 Lender
While the borrower is a long lived player, the lenders are short lived and are
solely concerned about the current period’s payoffs. Further, they have incom-
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plete information about the borrower’s type. The rating in each period, Rt re-
flects their beliefs about the borrower being of high type. Based on Rt, they de-
cide whether they would like to lend their money and determine the interest rate.
Their strategy function is given by:
{
lt, it
}
: Rt → {{0, 1} ,R+}.
For a lender, lending is equivalent to investing in a risky project which can
potentially give him a payoff higher than the risk free return 1+ ir f . If the project
is funded, any of the following three outcomes can occur:
1. The project fails and the borrower defaults non-strategically - which is ex-
pected to happen with probability Rt (1− θH) + (1− Rt) (1− θL) - in which
case the lender receives 0.
2. The project succeeds and the borrower chooses to repay- which is expected
to happen with probability RtθHrtH + (1− Rt) θLrtL- in which case the lender
receives the contracted amount of 1+ it.
3. The project succeeds and the borrower chooses to default strategically - which
is expected to happen with probability RtθH(1− rtH) + (1− Rt)θL(1− rtL) -
in which case the lender receives an expected return of βM.
Competition among the lenders will ensure that, given Rt, the expected return
from lending is same as that from investing in the risk free asset 1+ ir f . Equating
the two returns gives us the interest rate choice function of the lenders as:
1+ it = βM +
(1+ ir f )− [RtθH + (1− Rt)θL]βM
[RtθHrtH + (1− Rt)θLrtL]
(3.2)
Having characterized interest rate it as a function of
(
Rt, rtj , θj, βM
)
for j ∈
{H, L}, we make the following observations about the behavior of the interest
rate:
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Lemma 1 (Optimal interest rate choice) Given M, β, θj and rtj for θj ∈ {θH, θL}, the
interest rate function it is continuous and decreasing in Rt and βM.
A higher rating Rt indicates a greater likelihood of interacting with θH type of
borrower who succeeds with greater probability. βM reflects the lenders payoff
in the event of strategic default by the borrower. An increase in both of them
indicates a lower riskiness of the loan and hence a lower interest rate.
3.2.3 Timeline of the stage game
Nature releases a signal st
Rating agency issues its Rt
Lender decides whether or not to lend money and the interest rate
Lender:1+ ir f
Borrower:0
Not lend
Nature determines the outcome Yb of the project
Borrower chooses between default and repayment
default
Lender:βYb
Borrower:(1 − β)Yb
repayment
Lender:1 + it
Borrower:M − (1+ it)
1
Figure 3.1: Timeline of a stage game
The timeline of the game in any period t is presented in Figure 3.1. At the
beginning of each period, Nature releases an imperfectly informative signal st ∈
{sH, sL}, following which the rating agent issues a rating Rt. Upon observing Rt,
the lender makes his lending
(
lt
)
and interest rate
(
it
)
decision. If lt = 0, no
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lending takes place and the period ends. If lt = 1, lending occurs, the borrower
invests the money in the project, and Nature moves to determine the outcome Yb
of the project. Based on the outcome of the project, the borrower makes his choice
ct ∈
{
d, d
}
. This choice is viewed by the lender as well as the rating agent. If the
observed choice ct = d, the lender receives Yl = 1 + it and the borrower receives
M − (1+ it) in current stage . The period ends. If ct = d, with probability β,
the lender is privately able to confiscate the project’s outcome. He receives an
expected payoff of Yl = βYb, while the borrower receives an expected payoff of
(1− β)Yb in current stage. Then the period ends.
3.3 Equilibrium
It is easy to see that there always exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium for the
above defined game of finite horizon. Further, the above game always admits
a Markov Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (Theorem 13.2 of Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991)). We restrict our attention to the stationary Markov Perfect Bayesian Equi-
librium for this dynamic game of incomplete information.
3.3.1 Definition
A stationary Markov Perfect Equilibrium is a set of stationary Markov strate-
gies which constitute a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in each stage of the game.
Recall that Rt plays a dual role in the model. It is not only the strategy of the rat-
ing agent but also reflects the lenders’ beliefs about the borrower’s type. Hence,
the stationary Markov Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of this game is defined as
follows:
Definition 1 A strategy profile
{
rtH, r
t
L,
{
lt, it
}
, Rt
}T
t=1 constitutes a stationary Markov
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium if
39
• For any two t and τ (t not necessarily equal to τ), if Rt−1 = Rτ−1, rt−1H = rτ−1H ,
rt−1L = r
τ−1
L ,,c
t−1 = cτ−1 and st = sτ, then Rt = Rτ,rtH = r
τ
H and r
t
L = r
τ
L.
• The strategies {rtH, rtL, {lt, it}, Rt} are sequentially rational for all t.
• For all t and for all realized sequences of signals and observed choices∪tτ=1{sτ, cτ−1},
there exists a corresponding unique rating Rt given by
Rt =
q∏tτ=1 Pr
(
sτ, cτ−1|θ = θH
)
q∏tτ=1 Pr (sτ, cτ−1|θ = θH) + (1− q)∏tτ=1 Pr (sτ, cτ−1|θ = θL)
Or equivalently,
Rt =
Rt−1 Pr(st, ct−1|θ = θH)
Rt−1 Pr(st, ct−1|θ = θH) + (1− Rt−1)Pr(st, ct−1|θ = θL)
wherever possible.
3.3.2 Characterization
In this section we characterize the player’s equilibrium behavior in period t.
The equilibrium choices of the strategic players are marked with an asterisks (∗).
First, we will consider a case without the rating agent. That will provide us with
a benchmark to evaluate the benefits of having a rating agent.
3.3.2.1 Benchmark Case : Without Rating Agent
Consider the game specified in Section (3.2), with the slight modification that
there are only two types of players in each stage - borrower and lenders. The pay-
offs of the borrower and lenders are identical to those described above. However,
there is no rating agent now, so no additional informative signal is observed in
any period and the lenders in a given period do not have any information about
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the borrower’s default history. For the sake of notational simplicity, we would
still use Rt to reflect lenders beliefs about the borrower being of type θH. In this
case, Rt = q for all t ≤ T, and is independent of the borrowers default history{
cτ−1
}t
τ=1. The borrower’s expected continuation payoffs from two choices be-
come same and EVj
(
Rt+1|d
)
− EVj
(
Rt+1|d
)
= 0. Absence of future concerns and
identical present concerns makes the decision problem ex-post identical for all bor-
rower types and across all time periods. Conditional on the success of the project,
the borrower would choose to repay his loan if and only if the interest payment
1+ i∗t is lower than his expected payoff from default : βM. Substituting for 1+ i∗t
from equation (3.2), it can be seen that there exists a threshold rating 0 < Rut
≡
[
1+ir f
βM − θL
]
1
θH−θL < 1 such that, conditional on the project’s success, borrow-
ers finds it optimum to repay their loans for all higher levels of ratings. Given the
borrowers’ equilibrium responses, it is easy to see that the lending occurs only for
Rt ≥ Rut . Hence, the equilibrium of this game can be summarized as follows:
1. r∗tH = r
∗t
L = l
∗t = 0 for all t if Rt < Rut .
2. r∗tH = r
∗t
L = l
∗t = 1 and 1+ i∗t = 1+ir fRtθH+(1−Rt)θL for all t if Rt ≥ Rut .
3.3.2.2 With Rating Agent
For the rest of this paper, we would consider the original model specified in
Section (3.2). In the presence of the rating agent, the lender’s beliefs about the bor-
rower’s type are not same as the prior q any more and are affected by borrower’s
choices and observed signals (if the signals are informative). For a given stage
t and rating Rt, either of two following two situations can arise in terms of the
borrower’s equilibrium behavior:
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1. θHr∗tH < θLr
∗t
L
This means that for stage t, in equilibrium, likelihood of repayment by the
high type of borrower is lower than the likelihood of repayment by low
type of borrower. This implies that, for stage t + 1, the rating after de-
fault Rt+1|d,st+1 exceeds the rating after repayment, Rt+1|d,st+1 for all s
t+1 ∈
{sH, sL} and consequently EVj
(
Rt+1|d
)
is higher than EVj
(
Rt+1|d
)
. This
equilibrium is possible only for Rt ≥ Rut . It was shown in subsection (3.3.2.1)
that this is the region where, in the absence of rating agent, borrowers find
it optimal to pay back. Hence, if this equilibrium exists, then using any his-
torical information about the borrower unambiguously hurts the market.
2. θHr∗tH ≥ θLr∗tL
This means that for stage t, in equilibrium, likelihood of repayment by the
θH type of borrower is higher than the likelihood of repayment by θL type of
borrower. This implies that, for stage t+ 1, the rating after default Rt+1|d,st+1
is lower than the rating after repayment, Rt+1|d,st+1 for all s
t+1 ∈ {sH, sL} and
consequently EVj
(
Rt+1|d
)
is lower than EVj
(
Rt+1|d
)
. As we show below,
such an equilibrium always exists for all Rt ∈ [0, 1].
For the most of this paper, we would focus on the equilibria for which θHr∗tH ≥
θLr∗tL holds for all stages t and defer the discussion of the second type of equilib-
rium to Section (3.5).
We characterize the borrowers behavior when they can make strategic choices.
Conditional on the project’s success, the equilibrium behavior of the borrowers is
given by the following lemma.
Proposition 6 (Borrower’s equilibrium behavior) Given Rt ∈ (0, 1), ps ≥ 12 , there
exists an equilibrium such that
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1. Both types of borrowers pool on default (d), that is, r∗tH = r
∗t
L = 0 for Rt <
RtθH (ps) .
2. Borrowers separate, that is, r∗tH = 1 and r
∗t
L ∈ [0, 1) for RtθH (ps) ≤ Rt <
RtθL (ps) ≤ Rut
3. Both types of borrowers pool on repayment (d¯), that is, r∗tH = r
∗t
L = 1 for Rt ≥
RtθL (ps)
where r∗tj solves equation (3.1) and Rtθj satisfies M −
(
1+ i∗t
)
+ EVj
(
Rt+1|d¯
)
=
(1− β) M + EVj
(
Rt+1|d
)
and M ≥ 1+ i∗t for j ∈ {H, L}.
In equilibrium, borrowers follow a threshold strategy where they repay their
loans surely for all ratings higher than a certain threshold rating. For very high
levels of ratings, both borrowers pool on repayment. For very low levels of rat-
ings, both borrowers pool on defaults. For intermediate levels of ratings, the low
type of borrower does not pool with the high type of borrower. This happens
because, ceteris paribus, a high type of borrower is more likely to succeed in his
projects and also observe sH signals. His expected value of continuation payoffs
EVj(.) is higher than that of low type of borrower. This induces him to pay a
higher interest rate today. Given Lemma (1) and equation (3.1), this implies that
in any stage t, the threshold rating beyond which the θH borrower starts repaying
is at most as high as the threshold rating for θL borrower.
While a pure strategy equilibrium always exists for the high type of borrower,
this may not be the case with the low type of borrower. The increases in the likeli-
hood of repayments by both types of borrowers r∗tH and r
∗t
L result in a lower interest
rate in current stage, however, they affect the future ratings and in turn, continua-
tion payoffs differently. The rating after ct = d¯, Rt+1|d,st+1 (resp. c
t = d, Rt+1|d,st+1)
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is increasing (resp. decreasing) in r∗tH . This, in turn, implies that EVj
(
Rt+1|d,st+1
)
(resp. EVj
(
Rt+1|d,st+1
)
) is increasing (resp. decreasing) in r∗tH and decreasing (resp.
increasing) in r∗tL . Hence, it is in the interest of the high type of borrower to choose
repayment (d¯), instead of mixing. On the other hand, rating after ct = d¯, Rt+1|d,st+1
(resp. ct = d, Rt+1|d,st+1) is decreasing (resp. increasing) in r∗tL . This, in turn, im-
plies that EVj
(
Rt+1|d,st+1
)
(resp. EVj
(
Rt+1|d,st+1
)
) is decreasing (resp. increasing)
in r∗tL . Hence, by increasing r
∗t
L , the low borrower might increase his payoffs in
current stage, his future payoffs may be lower. The presence of these opposing ef-
fects may sometimes prevent the θL borrower from choosing a pure strategy best
response.
It follows directly from Proposition (6) that the presence of a rating agent who
has access to the borrower’s history alters his repayment incentives. These incen-
tives serve as a disciplining tool and encourage more frequent repayments. In this
case, the usefulness of a rating agent who serves as a link between borrowing past
and present is indisputable. His presence helps in alleviating the moral hazard
experienced by the borrowers and discourages strategic defaults.
Given borrower’s repayment behavior in Proposition (6) and interest rate char-
acterization in equation (3.2), the lender’s equilibrium behavior is given by the
following lemma:
Lemma 2 (Lender’s equilibrium behavior) Given Rt ∈ [0, 1] and ps ≥ 12 , the lender
finds it optimal to not lend for all Rt < RtθH (ps) and to lend at the interest rate given by
equation (3.2) otherwise.
For ratings Rt < RtθH (ps), both types of borrowers find it optimal to default,
irrespective of the outcome of the project. The lender’s expected payoff from lend-
ing is given by [RtθH + (1− Rt) θL] βM, which is lower than 1+ ir f in these range
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of ratings.
For Rt ≥ RtθH (ps), at least the high type of borrower finds it optimal to repay
his loan. The jump in borrower’s behavior causes the lender’s payoff from lend-
ing to jump discontinuously. The interest rate, given by equation (3.2), adjusts to
ensure that his return from lending is same as that from not lending. Once lend-
ing becomes optimal, it always remains an optimal choice for all higher levels of
ratings as both the likelihood of repayments and the belief of lending to a high
type of borrower increases.
Figure 3.2 summarizes the results of Proposition 6 and Lemma 2.
0 RtθH RtθL 1Pooling on d Separating Pooling on d
No lending Lending
1
Figure 3.2: Equilibrium Behavior
Next, with the help of an example, we show that Rtθ is increasing in t.
Example 3 Consider a game where borrower interacts with the lenders for T = 10 peri-
ods. Let the risk free return be ir f = 0.1, the output from a successful project be M = 10,
the probability of getting caught in case of default be β = 0.3, the likelihood of success
of high type of borrower be θH = 0.9, the likelihood of success of low type of borrower be
θL = 0.1 and the informativeness of the signal is ps = 0.7. Figure 3.3 show RtθH and
RtθL for this game:
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Figure 3.3: Changes in Rtθ with respect to t
It can be seen clearly from Figure 3.3 that RtθH is always at high as RtθL and
both of them are increasing in t.
3.4 Impact of Information
From Proposition (6), we can see that the repayment thresholds of the borrow-
ers, Rtθ are a function of the informativeness of the signal ps. In this section, we
analyze the impact of increasing the precision of the signal.
3.4.1 On the borrower’s behavior
We first analyze the impact of additional signals on the borrower behavior. We
find that, as the signals becomes more informative, borrowers’ repayment thresh-
olds become higher. And that brings us to the central result of this paper.
Proposition 7 (Non-encouraging impact of additional information) The repayment
threshold Rtθ(ps) is increasing in ps and converges to Rut .
The presence of an informative signal reduces the weight assigned to the ob-
served choices in determining future rating. Current period’s choice now has a
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weaker influence on future continuation payoffs. Recall that a realization of sig-
nal sH (resp. sL) results in a higher (resp. lower) rating. As a result, ceteris paribus,
the likelihood that a high type of borrower receives a higher rating increases in
ps. Expectations of a higher rating in future translate to a higher expected value of
continuation payoff. Similarly, ceteris paribus, the likelihood that a low type of bor-
rower receives a lower rating increases in ps. Expectations of a lower rating trans-
late to a lower expected value of continuation payoff. As a result, the marginal
gain in the future continuation payoffs from repayment decline and both types of
borrowers choose to repay their loan for increasingly lower levels of interest rates.
It can be seen from equation (3.2) that these lower interest rates would be realized
for higher levels of ratings in the current stage. Further, as ps → 1, the impact on
current observable action choice goes to 0, thereby inducing borrowers to behave
as they would have in the complete absence of the rating agent. Figures 3.4a and
3.4b show the behavior of RtθH and RtθH for Example 3 and ps = 0.5, 0.7 and 1.
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Figure 3.4: Changes in Rtθ with respect to ps
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Hence, our results suggest that the presence of an informative signal increases
the incidence of moral hazard among the borrowers.
3.4.2 On the existence of market
Market exists only if the borrower and lender interact with each other. Having
fully characterized the behavior of all the players in the market, it is straightfor-
ward to analyze the impact of extra information on the behavior of the lender.
Since lender moves first, his decision determines whether market exists in a stage
t or not.
Proposition 8 (Frequent market failure) The range of ratings over which lending does
not happen increases in ps.
The above result follows directly by combining lemma (2) with the Proposi-
tion (7). The frequent defaults in the presence of informative signals translate to
frequent market failure too.
3.4.3 On the asymptotic behavior of ratings
In this section, we analyze the asymptotic behavior of the lenders’ beliefs. We
find that in the long run, if the rating is based on the borrower’s history, then
the reputation effects diminish and the lender learns about the true type of the
borrower. If the borrower is of high type, the rating converges to 1; otherwise it
converges to 0. We can summarize this result as following lemma:
Lemma 3 As t→ ∞, Rt converges to either 0 or 1.
However, the additional presence of an informative signal speeds up this con-
vergence process. The true type of the borrower gets revealed faster as the infor-
mativeness of the signal increases.
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Proposition 9 (Faster convergence) The rate of convergence of Rt increases in ps.
Hence, the presence of an informative signal dissipates the problem of adverse
selection at a faster rate. While this is beneficial for the high type of borrower, it
adversely affects the low type of borrower. However, since market quickly con-
verges to efficient outcome, this is overall welfare enhancing.
Lastly, we analyze the impact of extra information on the welfare of the bor-
rowers. Ex-post, compared to the case when no signal is observed, if the realized
signal at the beginning of stage t is sH, ceteris paribus, one would expect borrowers
to be better off as it would result in a higher rating. Similarly, ceteris paribus, if the
signal observed is sL, the borrowers are expected to be worse off as the resulting
rating is now lower. However, as the following discussion shows, this may not
always be the case as the informativeness of the signals affects borrower’s repay-
ment behavior and in turn, lenders’ decisions too.
For Rt ∈ (RtH(12), RtH(ps)], the borrowers are unambiguously worse off due to
the presence of extra information as, in the presence of signal, no lending occurs
in this region.
Consider Rt ∈ (RtL(12), RtL(ps)]6. In this range of ratings both types of bor-
rowers would have repaid with certainty in the absence of signals, conditional on
success of the project. However, with the additional signal, the optimal choice
of the low type of borrower changes now. This means that interest rate charged
by lender t, it would be higher. If a given borrower chooses to repay his loan
for this range of ratings, he experiences a negative impact on the current stage’s
payoff. However, this decline in r∗tL has a positive impact on the gains in continua-
tion payoffs, EVj
(
Rt+1|d
)
− EVj
(
Rt+1|d
)
. Depending on which of the two effects
6Recall that ps = 12 corresponds to the the case where signals are completely uninformative and
are as good as not observing them.
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dominate, the borrower’s welfare can be higher or lower in the presence of these
signals.
3.5 Other Possible Equilibria
In this section, we focus on the equilibrium for which θHr∗tH < θLr
∗t
L happens
for some at least some stages t. For these class of equilibria, the observance of
costly choice of repayment is associated with the greater likelihood of the bor-
rower being of θL type and, ceteris paribus, results in a lower rating relative to
default. Depending on the parameters of the model, these equilibria may arise if
the following condition is satisfied:
EVH
(
Rt+1|d
)
− EVH
(
Rt+1|d
)
≥ βM− (1+ i∗t ) ≥ EVL
(
Rt+1|d
)
− EVL
(
Rt+1|d
)
(3.3)
For these class of equilibria, EVj
(
Rt+1|d
)
− EVj
(
Rt+1|d
)
≥ 0. Thus, these equi-
libria enhance the attractiveness of default (d) for the borrower. It can be easily
seen from equation (3.2) that 1 + i∗t lower than βM is possible only for Rt ≥ Rut
≡
[
1+ir f
βM − θL
]
1
θH−θL . Further, for these ratings, the equilibrium interest rate is in-
creasing in r∗tj . Neither type of borrowers have an incentive to deviate. For a high
type borrower, the gain in continuation payoffs after default outweighs the loss in
current payoffs due to choosing this strategy. A similar reasoning applies to low
type borrower, for whom the gain in current payoffs by choosing d outweighs the
expected change in future payoffs. The lender holds a strong belief about the bor-
rower being of θH type and expects to receive 0 with very low probability. Hence,
lending still occurs for this equilibrium.
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3.5.1 Example
Consider a two-stage interaction between borrower and lender. Let the risk
free return be ir f = 0, the output from a successful project be M = 2, the prob-
ability of getting caught in case of default be β = 0.6, the likelihood of success
of high type of borrower be θH = 0.95 and the likelihood of success of low type
of borrower be θL = 0.4. We use backward induction to solve for the sequential
equilibrium of this game.
Stage 2: In this stage, neither of the borrowers have future concerns and they behave
identically. That is, r∗2H = r
∗2
L . Using equations (3.2) and (B)(in Appendix
A), we find that r∗2H = r
∗2
L = 1 for all R2 ≥ 0.79 and r∗2H = r∗2L = 0 for all
R2 ≤ 0.79. Having characterized the equilibrium in Stage 2, we proceed to
characterizing the equilibrium in the previous stage.
Stage 1: We observe that if θHr∗1H < θLr
∗1
L , then R2|d,s2 > R2|d,s2 . Combining equations
(B) and (3.3), we find that such an equilibrium is possible only for R1 ≥ 0.79.
Step 1: Fix r1H = 0 and find that r
∗t
L for all R1 ≥ 0.79. Figure 3.5a shows the best
response function of θL borrower if r1H = 0.
Step 2: Given r∗1L determined in Step 1 above, find r
∗1
H . Figure 3.5b shows the
best response function of θH borrower for r∗1L .
It is easy to see that r∗1H = 0 and r
∗1
L > 0 for 0.79 ≤ R1 ≤ 0.82.
The possibility of existence of these equilibria is a direct implication of drop-
ping the assumption of presence of behavioral player types. Further, as we prove
in the following subsection, their existence is associated with very high levels of
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Figure 3.5: Example
ratings Rt for which borrower finds it optimal to choose to repay even in a one-
shot game. Thus, reputation concerns in this equilibrium are bad and utilizing
any amount of borrower’s information history unambiguously hurts the repay-
ment incentives faced by the borrowers.
3.6 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the generalizability and extendability of our as-
sumptions:
1. The parameter θ can be interpreted in many other ways. One possible inter-
pretation of it is a measure of the riskiness of available projects. It can also
be interpreted as the discount factor of the players. Under these interpreta-
tions, the high type of borrower is the one with access to less risky projects
and with greater patience. While we assume that the failed projects yields
nothing, the results would not change if the failed projects yield a positive
outcome ML as long as ML is low enough to incapacitate the borrower from
repaying his loan. The results can also be generalized to the presence of
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multiple borrower types.
2. While βM captures the lenders expected payoff when there is a strategic
default in an unsecured loan, it can also be understood to depict the (state-
contingent) collateral of a secured loan. Thus, the model is applicable to
both to secured and unsecured products. In the paper, this parameter β is
assumed to be exogenously given. In the real world, the extra information
(signals) are used for estimating it.
3. The interactions between lenders and borrower are modeled as short run
interactions where default choice on past loan in observed before receiving
any future loans. This may rarely seem to the case in the real world. Most of
the real world loans are of longer terms and money is borrowed only once
and follows a series of installments to be paid. While the act of borrowing
may not happen repeatedly, the model is still applicable as these loans carry
price triggers and a single default causes the future interest rate on the same
loans to jump up.
3.7 Conclusion
The results indicate that the presence of a third party whose only function is
to facilitate exchange information observed action history among short run play-
ers does not have any impact on the behavior of the players, compared to the
case when players directly observe each other’s experiences. However, if this
third party brings in some additional information, then it alters the equilibrium
but not necessarily in a positive manner. Additional independent signals reduce
the significance of the information transmitted by the observable action, thereby
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reducing the incentive to behave nicely. The disciplinary impact of reputation fur-
ther decreases as this additional information becomes more and more informative.
The result has specific implications for credit markets in terms of the benefits of
collecting information about the financial status-quo of the borrowers from time
to time. The paper recommends that, in order to maximize repayments, more
products based on the repayment history should be offered by the market.
To make the results of this paper extendable to the capital markets, we would
like to consider a strategic rating agent who is not always interested in issuing
an unbiased rating. We will integrate the repeated games analysis with studies in
information systems to allow for alternative ways of processing information. This
would be useful in ensuring wider applicability of these results.
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4. MORAL HAZARD IN CREDIT MARKETS: EVIDENCE FROM
PROSPER.COM
4.1 Introduction
The past decade experienced a rise in the number of consumer defaults. S&P/
Experian Consumer Credit Default Composite Index consistently rose from 1.39%
in July 2004 to 5.51% in May 2009.1 This rise in defaults was accompanied with
rising concern in the lending industry that an increasing number of these defaults
were strategic in nature and led to a spur in research to develop newer models to
identify such risks stemming from moral hazard among borrowers.2 In contrast,
the advocates of consumer credit blamed the recession for this rise.3 In the light
of this growing literature, this study provides evidence for the presence of moral
hazard in a consumer credit market. The debate on moral hazard versus nega-
tive shocks as the main driver of borrower default, or at an extreme declaration
of bankruptcy, is an extensive and ongoing one between economists. In support
of the moral hazard hypothesis, some of the reasons given in literature for strate-
gic defaults include the financial benefits from bankruptcy (Fay et al. (2002), Gan
et al. (2011))., very sharp decline in home equity (Foote et al. (2008), Bajari et al.
(2008), Guiso et al. (2009), Bhutta et al. (2011)), lower stigma associated with de-
fault (Gross and Souleles (2002), Fay et al. (1998)) etc. There is also a parallel
stream of literature claiming that consumer defaults are mainly triggered by neg-
1This is a proprietary index developed by S&P in collaboration with Experian and is based on
the default behavior in credit cards, auto loans, first lien mortgages and second lien mortgages
for a selected sample of US population. It is meant to be indicative of the consumer credit market
trends.
2(See for example http://www.fico.com/en/Communities/Pages/Insights.aspx for a
glimpse into research conducted by FICO about changing consumer behavior.)
3(See for example http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1876293,00.
html)
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ative shocks like unemployment (Sullivan et al., 1989), divorce (Gan et al., 2011)
and medical bills (Himmelstein et al. (2005)).
We use a unique data set from an online peer-to-peer lending marketplace-
Prosper Marketplace Inc or more commonly known as Prosper.com. Our ap-
proach involves identifying moral hazard in a credit market by using an exoge-
nous policy change on Prosper.com where borrowers incentives for repayments
on their unsecured loans were altered by reporting their repayment behavior to
TransUnion. This policy change increased the costs of defaulting in Prosper Mar-
ketplace by increasing the impact of their repayment behavior in this market on
access to credit in other markets.
Post the policy change, we observed a decline in default rates, mostly for the
high risk borrowers.4 Given that there is no reason for the probability of negative
shocks to change discontinuously at the time of the policy change, we attribute
this ex-post decline in the defaults to the moral hazard among the borrowers.
Using time series approach on entire population. we find that prior to the
change, the default rate was 9.5 percentage points higher and correspondingly,
the internal rate of return on the loans was 6.6 percentage points lower. Further,
to control for time varying effects such as macro economic effects, lender learning,
information increments on the Prosper platform etc., we estimate a differences-in-
differences model using the less treated, high credit score, low risk borrowers as
the counter-factuals for the more treated, low credit score, high risk borrowers. We
find that, prior to the change, relative to low risk borrowers, high risk borrowers
had default rates that were larger by 9 to 11 percentage points and internal rates
of return lower by 13 percentage points.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides background
4Borrowers with a credit score lower than 680 are considered high risk.
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information on Prosper.com and available data. Section 4.3 contains the results
and Section 4.4 provides the outcomes of falsification tests. Section 4.5 concludes.
All the Tables and Figures referenced in the text are provided in Appendix C.
4.2 Background on Prosper.com
The data used in this paper comes from Prosper.com.5 Prosper.com is an on-
line peer-to-peer lending marketplace i.e. it serves as a platform for its lender
members to make loans to its borrower members. It was opened to the public
on February 13, 2006. All the loans on Prosper.com are unsecured and are for 36
months. They carry a fixed simple interest rate, are payable in monthly install-
ments and are fully amortized. For the duration of our analysis, there was no
secondary market for these loans. So once issued, the lenders completely bore
any risk of default associated with them.
To become a member in this market, all individuals need to register with their
name, social security number and bank account information. Additionally, the
borrower members need to provide their driver’s license and address. Prosper
uses this information to authenticate the borrower and retrieve his credit history
and score from Experian.
The borrower members can post a “listing” specifying details like loan amount
requested, maximum offered interest rate, purpose of the loan, city & state of
residence. They could optionally post a picture, a description about themselves
along with self reported income and employment information. The listing will
also contain credit information which are mostly verified by Prosper through the
credit check from Experian. This includes the debt to income ratio, past and cur-
rent delinquencies, available credit lines, home ownership status, recent credit in-
5The data were downloaded from Prosper.com web API at http://www.prosper.com/tools/
DataExport.aspx on December 12, 2012.
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quiries etc. Although Prosper observes the actual credit score of the borrower only
a credit grade is posted on the listing. These credit grades are typically 40 point
credit score ranges containing the actual credit score of the borrower. Within our
data sample, credit grades are defined as follows: AA = scores 760 or above, A =
720-759, B = 680-719, C = 640-679, D = 600-639, E = 560-599 and HR = 520-559.
The lending process is similar to a Vickery-English auction process.6 Once cre-
ated, a listing is available for view to all the members. Additionally, members
can see the percentage of loan funded, current prevailing interest rate and the
number of bids placed so far. If a lender member likes a given listing, he can
place a bid on the portion of requested amount that he would like to fund and the
minimum acceptable interest rate (The lenders bid competitively to offer a lower
interest rate. At the time of listing creation, the borrower can choose “autofund-
ing” which means that future bidding on a listing is stopped as soon as its fully
funded. Otherwise, the maximum allowable duration for the listing to remain
open for bidding is 10 days.7. If a listing is fully funded, the interest rate of the
marginal losing lender becomes the prevailing interest rate on the loan.
We observe all of the listings and loans together with the credit profile infor-
mation of borrower members, since the inception of Prosper in February 2006.
But we restrict our analysis to the loans that were issued between April 18, 2006
and October 16, 2008. On April 18th 2006, Prosper.com changed the level of credit
profile information on the listings. (Miller, 2011) finds that this change allowed
the lenders to select borrowers of better quality resulting in a drop in default rates
among loans issued immediately after the change. To prevent this selection from
6In this type of auction, buyer (auctioneer) specifies a maximum price he is willing to pay for a
single unit of a good and the sellers (bidders) compete with each other to drive the prices down.
While the seller with the lowest bid sells the good, he receives a price equal to the second lowest
bid.
7Before March 30, 2006, it was 14 days.
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affecting our results, we drop all loans issued before this change. On October
16th 2008, Prosper started its process to register with SEC. As a result, it had to
cease most of its operations. 8 Post registration, various changes occurred on the
Prosper platform, rendering the loans issued before and after the change incom-
parable.9 On February 12th 2007, Prosper made explicit changes to credit score
eligibility and credit range definitions. Credit grades AA to D remained the same.
The range of E grade was changed from 540-599 to 560-599. HR grade was re-
vised from including all scores below 540 to the range of 520-559. Borrowers with
no credit score information or credit score below 520 were no longer allowed to
list. To account for this, we dropped all the loans with no recorded credit grade.
We also dropped all the HR credit grade loans made before February 12th 2007
with either missing 20 point credit range data or a credit score below 520.
In the final data we observe 27,046 loans. Figure C.1 shows the distribution of
all listings, loans and defaulted loans across the credit grades. More than half of
the listings are comprised of borrowers with credit score between 520 and 600 (i.e.
grades E and HR). The loans however, have a much more uniform distribution
across the credit grades. As can be expected, most of the loans that default belong
to the lower or riskier credit grades. The E and HR grades comprise of 20% of the
loans but close to 30% of the defaults. Though the lenders only observe the credit
grades, we have access to a narrower credit range of 20 points for most loans.10
8New members were no longer allowed to register. No new loans were allowed to made, while
existing loans were continued to be serviced as before.
9Some of the changes that were made after the SEC registration include: Residents of some
states in US were no longer allowed to register as members. Registered borrowers with credit
scores lower than 640 were no longer allowed to post a listing. Instead of the credit scores, each
listing was now assigned a proprietary ’Prosper Rating’. Lenders would bid on yield rate and not
the interest rate.
10In the final data sample, we observe the 20 point range for 20403 loans which is around 75% of
all loans. The loans with the 20 point range data missing are assigned to the lowest 20 point credit
bin in the credit grade.
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Details of the credit grades, the 20 point credit bins and the distribution of loans
across them are also presented in Table C.1.
The descriptive statistics for the loan level control and dependent variables
are presented in Table C.2. The means and standard deviations are presented
separately by risk type of borrower and by the time period before and after the
policy change. 11 Among the listings which materialized into loans, the low risk
ones received more bids on average than the high risk ones. The difference in
the number of bids is significantly larger in the post period. Unsurprisingly, the
low risk borrowers pay a lower interest rate of almost 9 percentage points. Low
risk borrowers are more likely to be home owners, not any more likely to post a
picture on their listing or be associated with a better rated group than the high risk
borrowers. Except for the bid count, the differences in other confounders between
the two groups are steady over time. Finally the statistically significant differences
in the outcomes of interest, the default percentage and the internal rate of return
(IRR) are indicative of the effects of the policy change.
4.3 Empirical Approach and Results
4.3.1 Time Series Approach
On August 16th 2007, an announcement was made on the Prosper Discussion
Forum that all historical and future repayment activity on Prosper.com would
be reported to TransUnion, one of three major U.S. credit reporting agencies. 12
11Borrowers with credit scores of 680 and above (credit grades AA, A and B) are considered low
risk and those with scores below 680 (credit grades C, D, E and HR) are considered high risk.
12The announcement was part of a weekly site update. It received 2032 views
and 85 replies (http://web.archive.org/web/20070916062009/http://forums.prosper.com/
index.php?showforum=5). From the Aug 16th 2007 snapshot of the discussion forum, we found
that the forums had 11,718 registered members at the time (http://web.archive.org/web/
20070816225516/http://forums.prosper.com/index.php). This policy change was also dis-
cussed on Prosper forums hosted by a third party website (http://www.prosperreport.com/
threads/3/0/6/30614.0.HTM).
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The announcement reminded readers that repayment activity was already being
reported to Experian.13 It also stated that Prosper would shortly start reporting to
Equifax as well. This policy change suddenly increased the penalties for default.
Using this abrupt change as a natural experiment, we test for the existence of
moral hazard in this credit market.
Our first empirical strategy is to employ a time series approach where we com-
pare the default and internal rate of returns of loans made in the period prior
to the treatment to those in the post period. Since the repayment behavior of
past, present and future loans were to be reported to TransUnion, the treatment
is retroactive. That is, the treatment applies to not only the loans originating after
August 16th 2007, but also the loans active at that date, albeit at a varying degree.
The loans that are 6 months old on treatment date are treated for a shorter por-
tion of their term than loans that are 3 months old. Loans originating after the
treatment date are all uniformly treated through their complete term. Figure C.2
shows default rates calculated in 30 day bins and the variation in treatment over
time.
To get around the retroactive nature of the treatment, we calculate what we call
”window outcomes”. Specifically, we calculate the default rates within 6, 9 and 12
months from the date of origination. These outcomes allow us to have a period of
time with no treatment. For example, Figure C.3 plots the variation in treatment
over time when the outcome of interest is the default rate within 9 months of
origination. The term here refers to the first 9 months since the origination of the
loan. The treatment does not apply to loans that are more than 9 months old on
the treatment date. Therefore, until -270 days, the fraction of term not treated is 1.
13Prosper was reporting repayment history to Experian from the beginning. (See
http://web.archive.org/web/20060209022718/http://www.prosper.com/public/help/
topics/borrower-credit_grades.aspx)
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This fraction begins to fall linearly between -270 and 0 days to treatment. Beyond
the treatment date, the fraction of the term not treated is 0.14
We estimate equation 4.1 below for the window and overall outcomes. The
treatment is appropriately defined for the different outcomes.
yit = β0 + β1TUt + θm + δXit + εit (4.1)
where yit is the outcome of interest. It can be a binary variable indicating de-
fault or the internal rate of return of loan i originating on date t. TUt is the treat-
ment variable that is coded as the fraction of the term not exposed to treatment
for loans originating on date t. θm are month of origin fixed effects where m is the
month in date t. Xit represents a vector of loan specific controls. The coefficient
of interest is β1 which is interpreted as the jump in the outcome generated by the
absence of treatment i.e. no reporting to TransUnion.
The results are presented in Table C.3. Each cell represents a separate regres-
sion. The outcomes include default rates within the first 6, 9 and 12 months,
overall default rates and internal rates of return. Column 1 shows results from
a basic linear regression with no controls. Column 2 shows results after including
month of origin fixed effects and column 3 is with additional loan level controls.
Columns 4 and 5 present results from the controlled regressions on sample with
only the high risk loans, with credit scores less than 680 and 600 respectively. Ro-
bust standard errors are presented in parenthesis.
The fully controlled regression is our preferred specification. Under this spec-
ification, all the estimates are significant at the 1% level. In the entire sample,
including loans from all risk levels, the pre-treatment default rate is 9.48 percent-
14Treatment is defined this way to be consistent with the differences-in-differences approach
described in Section 4.3.2.
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age points higher. This translates to 25% more defaults when repayment activity
was not being reported to TU. The recovery rate is lower in the pre-treatment
period by 6.61 percentage points which is equivalent to internal rate of returns
that are 40% worse on average. Borrowers are 3 percentage points or 22.6% more
likely to default within first 9 months of origin prior to TransUnion reporting. By
focusing on the high risk loan pools, we find the effect to be more pronounced.
Within loans of credit scores of less than 680, borrowers are 26.8% more likely to
default within first 9 months. When credit scores are limited to be less than 600,
the default rate was 41.8% higher in the period with no reporting to TransUnion.
For these estimates to be an accurate measure of the causal effect of treatment,
we need the identifying assumption that in the absence of treatment, the repay-
ment behavior for loans made post treatment on average would be similar to that
for the loans made prior to treatment. The presence of any kind of trend in repay-
ment outcomes due to external/macro factors, gradual lender learning or changes
to level of information on the Prosper platform would be problematic for this iden-
tification strategy. To overcome these shortcomings, we estimate a Differences-in-
Differences model discussed in Section 4.3.2.
4.3.2 Differences-In-Differences Approach
While the policy change of reporting to TransUnion is applicable to all borrow-
ers on Prosper.com, we argue that it has heterogeneous effects on borrowers of dif-
ferent risk profiles. It is reasonable to assume that the change increases the penalty
for default or the incentive to repay but the mechanism is unclear. We analyze a
few possible mechanisms through which this policy change might influence bor-
rower behavior. If the announcement acted as a reminder increasing the salience
of the penalties for delinquency, we think that the more financially informed low
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risk borrowers are less treated than the high risk borrowers. If the change simply
induces the marginal effect of reporting repayments to an additional credit bu-
reau, then we expect all the borrowers to be affected. For the borrowers who are
taking the loan for debt consolidation, reporting to an additional credit bureau
would increase the incentive to repay by providing them with a chance to repair
their credit score from another credit bureau. We can expect such an incentive
to also be greater for the high risk borrowers with lower credit scores. With this
in mind, we implement a differences-in-differences model using the low risk bor-
rowers as the control group and the high risk borrowers as the treated group. To
the extent that our control group gets treated by this policy change, our diff-in-diff
estimator will be attenuated towards zero.
According to Experian National Score Index, the average credit score in April
2006 for US was 678. 15 Hence, we categorized the borrowers with credit scores
of 680 and above (credit grades AA, A and B) as low risk and borrowers with
credit scores less than 680 (credit grades C, D, E and HR) as high risk. The default
rates in grades C and below are as high as 39% and above in the period prior to
treatment.16 In our data sample, by this definition, high risk borrowers account
for 85% of the listings, 60% of the loans and 70% of the defaults as shown in Figure
C.1.
In order to estimate the differences-in-differences model, we divide the loans
into 15 bins of mostly 20 credit score points each. The details of the credit score
bins are presented in Table C.1. In the spirit of the guidelines prescribed in Bertrand
et al. (2004), to account for the auto-correlation in the standard errors within the
bins, we collapse the data into 2 periods, pre and post treatment.17 Specifically,
15http://www.creditsourceonline.com/credit-score-stats.html
16Default rate in grade B was 30%.
17Since we have very few clusters, estimating the diff-in-diff at the loan level and clustering
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we estimate equation 4.2 below for the window outcomes (default rates with 6, 9
and 12 months of origination) and overall default and internal rates of return.
ybt = β0 + β1Pret + β2. (HighRisk ∗ Pre)bt + θb + δXbt + εbt (4.2)
where t takes values 1 and 0 indicating the pre and post period relative to treat-
ment. b represents a bin of 20 credit score points.18 ybt and Xbt are the means of
the outcome of interest and vector of loan level controls respectively calculated
for credit bin b at period t. Pret is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if t is in
the pre period. HighRiskbt is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the highest
credit score in bin b is less than 680. θb are credit bin level fixed effects. β2 is the
differences-in-difference estimator of interest. It will have a reduced form inter-
pretation as the treatment does not jump from 0 to 1 from the pre to post period.19
We repeat the exercise with the log of the outcomes as well i.e. with ybt being the
log of the means of default rates within credit bin b at period t.20
The validity of the differences-in-differences estimate hinges on the key identi-
fying assumption that in the absence of the policy change, the default behavior of
the high risk borrowers would have trended similar to that of the low risk borrow-
ers. Figures C.4 and C.5 provide some visual evidence to corroborate this claim.
Figure C.4 shows plots of default rates within 60 day bins on either side of the
treatment date, separately by risk type of the loans (borrowers). Figure C.5 is a
similar graph of internal rate of returns for the two groups. From both the graphs
we see that the two groups are trending fairly similar to each other in the pre-
standard errors at the individual credit score bin level is not an option.
18See Table 4 for details.
19As discussed in Section 4.3.1 on time-series the variation in treatment over time is dependent
on the particular outcome.
20The log-linear analysis was limited to the default rates as the internal rates of return could be
negative numbers.
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treatment period. We perform various falsification tests, which are reported in
Section 4.4, by using placebo treatment dates to further convince us of the validity
of the identifying assumption.
A major concern with the time-series approach is the changing trends of other
confounding factors that might affect the outcomes of interest differently in the
pre period than in the post. By analysing lender portfolios over time, Freedman
and Jin (2008) find that lenders learn to select better borrowers over time. Iyer
et al. (2009) find that using the information posted on the listings, lenders are able
to judge about 1/3 of the credit worthiness of the borrowers. They show that the
resulting effect is that , lenders are able to lend at 1.06 percentage points lower rate
to better borrowers within the same credit grade (of 40 credit score points) with-
out observing the actual credit score. However, the extent to which the effects of
confounders, be it the macro economic environment or lender learning over time
or reducing information asymmetry, on the high risk and low risk groups trend
similarly, the differences-in-differences estimator is not affected. (Miller, 2011)
implements a regression discontinuity design and finds that the provision of ad-
ditional credit information causes lenders to screen better borrowers, more so in
the lower credit grades. 21 The drop in default rates occur predominantly in the
high risk group (credit scores less than 680). We account for this in a couple of
ways. Firstly, we exclude loans made before April 18th, 2006. 22 In our empirical
strategy, we exploit the variation within 20 point credit bins between the pre and
21The Credit Grade and Debt to Income Ratio was available all along. Additional information
made available included Homeownership Status, Current Delinquencies, Delinquencies Last 7
Yrs, Public Records Last 10 Yrs, Credit Inquiries, Total Credit Lines and First Credit Activity (Date)
22Some information increments followed. From February 12th 2007, lenders could see more
credit and employment data including monetary amount delinquent, utilization rate of available
revolving credit, number of public records in the last 12 months, number of current credit lines,
number of open credit lines, self-reported income, employment and occupation. From October
30th, 2007 onwards, lenders could see the estimated loss probability calculated by Prosper on all
of the listings. While this was not a change in information, it made the information more salient.
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post period. The lenders can only observe credit grades which are 40 point bins.
If additional credit information causes lenders to migrate from one 20 point bin
to another, it will not affect our results. To the extent the information increments
caused lenders to move from the lower end of the 20 point bin in the pre-period to
the higher end in the post period, and this movement was larger for the high risk
borrowers than the low risk ones, our results will be biased upwards. We do con-
trol for number of bids on the loans and interest rates, which are both indicators
of lenders’ assessment of borrower quality, to reduce some of the bias.
The results are presented in Tables C.4 and C.5. In both the tables, each cell
represents a separate regression. The effects of the policy change on window out-
comes i.e. default rates within the first 6, 9 and 12 months are presented in Panel
A. The effects on overall default rates and internal rates of return are presented
in Panel B. Column 1 shows results from the basic fixed effect panel model re-
gression with no controls and Column 2 shows the same with controls. The loan
level controls included are the number of bids, interest rate, borrower group rat-
ing, dummy variable for home ownership of the borrower and dummy variable
for an image on the listing. 23 In Table C.4, the final column on the right presents
the default rates and internal rates of return of the high risk borrowers in the pre-
treatment period, which provide the baseline to calculate the percentage effect of
treatment.
Table C.4 presents the differences-in-differences estimates from the linear re-
gressions. The pre-treatment default rate is 9 to 11 percentage points higher. That
is, borrowers were 20 to 25% more likely to default when repayment activity was
not being reported to TransUnion.24 In the pre-treatment period, the recovery rate
23The controls are also included by taking their means in the pre and post period for every credit
bin.
24The percentage effect is calculated by using the default rates and internal rates of return of
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is lower by around 13 percentage points or is 57% worse on average. Within the
first 9 months from loan origination, the default rate is close to 8 percentage points
or 44% more prior to TransUnion reporting. For almost all of the estimates, it is
comforting to find that the controls do not make a big difference. I.e. there is no
selection on observables within the high risk group over time relative to the low
risk group. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. Since the data
are collapsed into pre and post periods, the standard errors are not required to be
clustered at the credit bin level. All the estimates are significant at the 1% level.
Table C.5 presents the differences-in-differences estimates from the log linear
regressions i.e. the outcome variables are logs of default rates. Robust standard
errors are shown in parenthesis. The estimates in Column 1 from the OLS re-
gression without controls, are significant at the 1% level. But the estimates in
Column 2 from the regression with controls are imprecise except for the default
rates within 6 months from origination. We estimate 89.1% more defaults within
9 months from origination and 38.4% more defaults overall in the period with no
reporting to TransUnion.
4.4 Falsification Tests
We conduct a series of falsification tests by assigning placebo treatments in
the pre and post treatment periods. The tests follow the differences-in-difference
linear estimation specified in equation 4.2. We use only the pre-treatment period
data for placebo dates prior to treatment and only the post-treatment period data
for dates after treatment. We conduct the tests on 2 window outcomes, default
rates within 6 and 9 months from origination and 1 overall outcome, the default
rate. The placebo tests in the pre-treatment period are conducted only for the
high risk borrowers in the pre treatment period.
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window outcomes, as there is a portion of the pre-period with no variation in
treatment for these outcomes. 25 The results from these tests are presented in Table
C.6. Estimates from the actual treatment are in Panel A. Estimates of placebo tests
from pre-treatment period are in Panel B and those from post-treatment period
are in Panel C. 12 estimates out of 50 or 24% of the estimates are significant at the
10% level. Though this number is higher than desirable, only 2 estimates out of 50
(from t+270 days) are in the same direction and at least half in magnitude as the
estimate from actual treatment. All estimates from actual treatment are significant
at the 1% level and only 1 placebo estimate is significant at the 1% level and is in
the opposite direction.
4.5 Conclusion
In the wake of the recent recession, strategic defaults by borrowers and the
existence of moral hazard are growing concerns in credit industry. Since the un-
derlying factors leading to delinquencies are often unobserved, moral hazard is
hard to identify. The sudden policy change on Prosper.com of reporting the re-
payment histories to TransUnion provided us with a natural experiment allowing
us to test for the existence of moral hazard in this market.
Using the within credit bin variation in treatment in a differences-in-differences
framework, we find that that in the period prior to the policy change, default rates
were higher by around 9 to 11 percentage points and the internal rates of return
were lower by 13 percentage points. With the pre treatment default rates and in-
ternal rates of return of high risk borrowers as baseline, these translate to 25%
more likelihood of defaults and internal rates of return that are 40% worse in the
25This is shown in Figure C.3 for the default rate within 9 months from origination. From the
beginning of the sample until 270 days to treatment, the treatment does not vary. Where as for the
overall default rate, the treatment is continuously varying in the pre-treatment period as shown in
Figure C.2.
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period with no reporting to TransUnion. These results are robust to controlling
for the number of bids and interest rates on the loans which should capture the
lender assessment of borrower credit worthiness and there by account for lender
learning over time. We conduct a series of falsification tests by assigning placebo
treatments in the pre and post period. Less than 5% of the estimates are at least
half in magnitude as the estimates from true treatment, in the same direction and
significant at the 5% level.
We do not expect the announcement of the policy change at Prosper.com of
reporting repayment histories to TransUnion to coincide with any discontinuous
changes in external negative shocks probabilities. As a result we ascribe the 9 to 11
percentage point higher default rate in the period prior to reporting to the preva-
lence of moral hazard in this credit market. We believe that this paper contributes
to the growing literature on causes behind delinquencies and bankruptcies by us-
ing a unique change with increased the penalties of defaulting and can be very
informative to policy decisions on bankruptcy laws.
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5. CONCLUSION
In Chapter 2, we study the problem faced by a employee when choosing whether
to pursue an innovative idea as part of his employment at a firm or to form an in-
dependent start-up. We showed that employees who leave their employment to
pursue new ventures tend to develop products that are weakly related to their
former employers’ lines of business. While increasing the level of innovation sup-
port can induce the internal exploration of a wider range of ideas, we showed
that such policies may also increase employee turnover at the downstream devel-
opment stage. This finding is consistent with anecdotal evidence that suggests
that firms with the generous exploration policies also have a significant number
of employees leaving to form new ventures. When choosing its optimal level of
support, the firm in our model balances the benefits of inducing higher levels of
exploration in-house with the cost of supporting this exploration activity. We find
that the firm’s chosen level of support increases as its relative bargaining position
vis-a`-vis the employee strengthens.
In Chapter 3, we analyze the impact of reducing information asymmetry in
the credit markets by collecting not only a borrower’s repayment history, but
also other information such as past bankruptcies, public records, recent credit in-
quiries, etc.. We find that if a borrower expects his future lenders to base their
decisions on information beyond his repayment history experiences weaker in-
centives to repay his current loan and becomes more likely to strategically default
on his loan, especially for very high levels of interest rates. However, use of this
extra information assists the lender in expeditious screening of the borrowers. The
result has specific implications for credit markets in terms of the benefits of col-
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lecting information about the financial status-quo of the borrowers from time to
time.
In Chapter 4, we test for the presence of moral hazard in credit market by using
data from a sudden policy change of reporting the repayment histories to Tran-
sUnion in an online peer-to-peer lending market. In a differences-in-differences
framework, we find that that in the period prior to the policy change, default
rates were higher by around 9 to 11 percentage points and the internal rates of
return were lower by 13 percentage points. This translates to 25% more chance of
defaults and 40% lower internal rates of return for loans made to high risk bor-
rowers in the pre-change period. These results are robust to controls such as the
number of bids and interest rates, etc. which are expected to capture the lender as-
sessment of borrower credit worthiness and there by account for lender learning
over time.
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APPENDIX A.
PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 2
This appendix contains the proofs of all results presented in Chapter 2.
Proof of Proposition 1. We consider the case of vi = 0 and vi = v separately.
1. Let vi = 0. Then, the employee’s outside option is common knowledge and
equal to piEe = 0. Therefore, the employee would either choose to focus on
the core task with a payoff w or develop the innovation internally depend-
ing on the negotiation outcome. Given our tie breaking rule, agreement to
develop internally is possible if and only if positive bargaining surplus is
available. That is, if pi J = max{g∆∆, 0} ≥ piof + w = max{∆, 0} + w or
∆ > wgc∆−1 > 0. If the bargaining power is realized in the favor of the firm,
then it makes an offer of w. Otherwise, if the bargaining power is realized
in the favor of the employee, then he makes an offer of piof . In either sce-
nario, the offer is always accepted. For ∆ ∈ (0, wgc∆−1 ], the efficient outcome is
for the firm to develop independently and for the employee to focus on the
core task. Thus there are no disagreements for ∆ > 0 and ∆H (0) ≡ 0. For
∆ ≤ 0 ≡ ∆L (0), the efficient outcome is shelving.
2. Next we consider the case when vi = v. The employee makes a take-it-or-
leave-it offer of piof with probability (1− γ) , which is accepted by the firm
with probability 1.
If, on the other hand, the bargaining power is realized in favor of the firm,
occurring with probability γ, the firm has two options: 1) βHαev accepted
with probability 1 and resulting in an expected payoff of pi J − βHαev for the
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firm or 2) βLαev accepted with probability θI and resulting in an expected
payoff of (1− θI)(pi J − βLαev) + θIpiof for the firm. It is optimal for the firm
to offer βHαev if and only if its expected payoff from doing so exceeds its
expected payoff from offering βLαev. That is,
pi J ≥ piof + βLαev +
(βH − βL) αev
θI
(A.1)
For ∆ ≥ 0, it is straightforward to check that the above inequality is sat-
isfied iff ∆ ≥ θI(α f v+βLαev−v)+(βH−βL)αev
θI(gc∆−1) . Then given that ∆ ≤ ∆, we can
define ∆H(v, θI) ≡ min
{
max
{
θI(α f v+βLαev−v)+(βH−βL)αev
θI(gc∆−1) , 0
}
,∆
}
. Clearly,
∆H (v, θI) is non-increasing in θI . Further, ∆H (v, θI) > 0 if and only if θI <
(βH−βL)αe
1−α f−βLαe .
For ∆ ≤ 0, there are two cases to consider:
• ∆ ≥ − 1gs∆ v, in which case equation A.1 is satisfied if and only if ∆ ≤
− θI(α f v+βLαev−gvv)+(βH−βL)αev
θI(1−gs∆) ≡ ∆1(v, θI).
• ∆ < − 1gs∆ v, in which case equation A.1 is satisfied if and only if ∆ ≤
− θI(α f v+βLαev)+(βH−βL)αevθI ≡ ∆2(v, θI).
Combining the inequalities above it can be verified that, given ∆ < 0, equa-
tion A.1 is satisfied for max {∆1(v, θI),∆2(v, θI)}. Combining this with the
fact that∆ ≥ ∆, we can define∆L(v, θI) ≡ max{min{max{∆1(v, θI),∆2(v, θI)
}, 0},∆}. Clearly, ∆L (v, θI) is non-decreasing in θI . Further, ∆L(v, θI) < 0 if
and only if θI <
(βH−βL)αe
1−α f−βLαe .
Proof of Corollary 1. Consider vi = 0. From Proposition 1 it follows that if ∆ >
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w
gc∆−1 , the firm will make take-it-or-leave-it offer of w to the employee with proba-
bility γ and the employee will make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the firm of piof with
probability (1− γ). Both offers will be accepted with probability 1, resulting in
expected payoffs of piNf (0,∆, θI) = γ(pi
J − w) + (1− γ)piof and piNe (0,∆, β, θI) =
γw + (1− γ)(pi J − piof ). Otherwise,the idea is handled independently resulting
in payoffs of piNf (0,∆, θI) = pi
o
f = max {∆, 0} and piNe (0,∆, β, θI) = pioe = w.
piNf (0,∆, θI) is strictly increasing in ∆ for ∆ > 0 and independent of ∆ for ∆ < 0.
Similarly, piNe (0,∆, β, θI) is strictly increasing in ∆ for ∆ >
w
gc∆−1 and independent
of ∆ for ∆ < wgc∆−1 .
Now consider vi = v. From Proposition 1 it follows that negotiations are
always successful for ∆ /∈ (∆L(v),∆H(v)) and result in piNf (∆, v, θI) = γ(pi J −
βHαev)+ (1−γ)piof and piNe (v,∆, β, θI) = γβHαev+(1−γ)(pi J −piof ). Otherwise,
the high type employee rejects the firm’s offer of βLαev, resulting in piNf (∆, v, θI) =
γ[θIpi
o
f + (1 − θI)(pi J − βLαev)] + (1 − γ)piof and piNe (v,∆, β, θI) = γpioe + (1 −
γ)(pi J − piof ). It is straightforward to see that piNf (∆, v, θI) is strictly increasing
in ∆ for all ∆. piNe (v,∆, β, θI) is strictly increasing in ∆ for ∆ > 0 and strictly
decreasing in ∆ for ∆ < 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. We consider the case of vi = 0 and vi = v separately.
Case I Let vi = 0. Then, piEe (vi, β) = 0 and the employee chooses between internal
exploration and the core task. piCe (L) > pi Ie(0,∆, β, θI , L) if and only if piNe >
w. By Corollary 1, this implies that internal exploration takes place if and
only if ∆ > wgc∆−1 . Otherwise, given our tie breaking-rule, the employee
chooses to ignore the idea.
Case II Let vi = v. Then, internal exploration payoff always exceeds the payoff from
the core task and thus the employee chooses between internal and external
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exploration. pi Ie(v,∆, β, θI , L) is increasing in L for all β. Let D(L,∆, β, θI) ≡
pi Ie(0,∆, β, θI , L)− piEe (vi, β). It is straightforward to verify that D(L,∆, β, θI)
is increasing in L, increasing in ∆ for ∆ > 0 and decreasing in ∆ for ∆ < 0.
Internal exploration takes place if and only if D(L,∆, β, θI) ≥ 0. Let L¯(∆, β, θI)
denote the minimum level of support that induces internal exploration, solv-
ing D(L¯,∆, β, θI) = 0.
By Implicit function theorem, dL¯d∆ = −p(L¯) ∂pi
N
e /∂∆
∂D/∂L . From Corollary 1,
∂piNe
∂∆ >
0 for ∆ > 0 and ∂pi
N
e
∂∆ < 0 for ∆ < 0. Thus,
dL¯
d∆ < 0 for ∆ > 0 and
dL¯
d∆ > 0 for
∆ < 0.
Let
∆c(L, v, β, θI) =

0 if L > L¯(0, β, θI)
L¯−1(∆) if L ∈ [L¯(∆, β, θI), L¯(0, β, θI)]
∆ if L < L¯(∆, β, θI)
.
∆s(L, v, β, θI) =

∆ if L < L¯(∆, β, θI)
L¯−1(∆) if L ∈ [L¯(∆, β, θI), L¯(0, β, θI)]
0 if L > L¯(0, β, θI)
For a given L, internal exploration occurs if and only if ∆ ≥ ∆c(L, v, β, θI)
or ∆ ≤ ∆s(L, v, β, θI) where ∂∆c∂L = 1∂L¯/∂∆ < 0 and ∂∆s∂L = 1∂L¯/∂∆ > 0. By Im-
plicit Function Theorem, ∂∆c∂β = −
p(L) ∂pi
N
e
∂β −pov
∂D/∂∆ . Note that D(L,∆c, β, θI) =
0 implies that poβv > p(L)piNe . Moreover, p(L)
∂piNe
∂β ≤ p(L)αev < pov.
Therefore, ∂∆c∂β > 0 implying that ∆c(L, v, βL, θI) ≤ ∆c(L, v, βH, θI) for all
θI . Analogously, ∂∆s∂β = −
p(L) ∂pi
N
e
∂β −pov
∂D/∂∆ < 0, implying that ∆s(L, v, βL, θI) ≥
∆s(L, v, βH, θI) for all θI .
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It remains to determine θ∗I . By Corollary 1, pi
N
e (L, v, βH) is independent of
θI . Therefore, ∆s(L, v, βH) and ∆c(L, v, βH) will be independent of θI . Since
∆c(L, v, βL, θI) ≤ ∆c(L, v, βH) and ∆s(L, v, βL, θI) ≥ ∆s(L, v, βH)for all θI ,
both types choose internal exploration for ∆ /∈ (∆s(L, v, βH),∆c(L, v, βH))
and thus θ∗I = q. For ∆ ∈ (∆s(L, v, βH),∆c(L, v, βH)) the high type always
explores externally. Given θI = 0, low type of employee chooses internal
exploration if and only if ∆ 6∈ (∆s(L, v, βL, 0),∆c(L, v, βL, 0)). Therefore, if
∆ ∈ (∆s(L, v, βH),∆s(L, v, βL, 0)] or ∆ ∈ [∆c(L, v, βL, 0),∆c(L, v, βH)), the
low type explores internally and by Bayes’ rule θ∗I = 0.
Finally, for ∆ ∈ (∆s(L, v, βL, 0),∆c(L, v, βL, 0)), the only possible equilibrium
is for both types to explore externally. Otherwise, if θI is such that ∆ 6∈
(∆s(L, v, βL, θI),∆c(L, v, βL, θI)), then by Bayes’ rule θI = 0, resulting in a
contradiction. An off-equilibrium belief θI = 0 in this region guarantees no
deviation incentives by the low type.
Let ∆∗s (L, v, βH) = ∆s(L, v, βH), ∆∗c (L, v, βH) = ∆c(L, v, βH),
∆∗s (L, v, βL) = ∆s(L, v, βL, θ∗I ), ∆
∗
c (L, v, βL) = ∆c(L, v, βL, θ∗I ). This completes
the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. The probability of internal exploration is given by
W(L) =
[
(1− ψ)
(
1− F( w
gc∆ − 1
|0
)]
+
+ψ∑
β
Pr(β) [1− (F(∆∗c (L, v, β)|v)− F(∆∗s (L, v, β)|v))] .
Then, dWdL = ψ∑β Pr (β)
[
f (∆∗s )
∂∆∗s (L,v,β)
∂L − f (∆∗c ) ∂∆
∗
c (L,v,β)
∂L
]
> 0 since by Proposi-
tion 2 ∂∆
∗
s (L,v,β)
∂L ≥ 0 and ∂∆
∗
c (L,v,β)
∂L ≤ 0.
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By Proposition 2, θI ≤ q. Proposition 1 then implies that downstream disagree-
ments are not possible for θI ≥ q ≥ (βH−βL)αe1−α f−βLαe since then ∆L(v, θI) = ∆H(v, θI) = 0.
For q < (βH−βL)αe1−α f−βLαe , if ∆ ∈ (∆∗s (L, v, βH),∆∗c (L, v, βH)), by Proposition 2 θ∗I = 0. In
this case, ∆L(v, 0) = ∆H(v, 0) = 0 (see proof of Proposition 1). Therefore, a neces-
sary condition for downstream disagreements is ∆ /∈ (∆∗s (L, v, βH),∆∗c (L, v, βH)).
In this case, θ∗I = q and q <
(βH−βL)αe
1−α f−βLαe guarantees ∆L(v, θI) < 0 and ∆H(v, θI) >
0. Downstream disagreements occur if and only if ∆ ∈ (∆L(v, q),∆∗s (L, v, βH))
∪ (∆∗c (L, v, βH),∆H(v, q)). By Proposition 2, ∆∗s (L, v, βH) is increasing in L and
∆∗c (L, v, βH) is decreasing in L. Therefore, there exists L˜ such that the region of
downstream disagreements is non-empty and increasing in L.
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose that L∗ is an interior optimum. Let S f (∆, vi, β)
denote the firm’s surplus from internal exploration of the idea. The first order
derivative of the optimization problem expressed in Equation 2.1 is given as be-
low:
FOC(L) =

∑β Pr (β)∑vi Pr (vi)

E
(
∂S f (∆,vi,β,L)
∂L |∆ /∈ (∆s(.),∆c(.))
)
+S f (∆s, vi, β, L) f (∆s|vi) d∆sdL −
S f (∆c, vi, β, L) f (∆c|vi) d∆cdL

−1+ Pr (v) [F (∆c (v, L, β))− F (∆s (v, L, β))]−
L Pr (v)
[
f (∆c(.)|v) d∆cdL − f (∆s(.)|v) d∆sdL
]

Then, L∗ solves FOC(L∗) = 0. Using implicit function theorem on equation 2.2,
we obtain:
dL∗
dγ
= −
∂FOC(L∗)
∂γ +
∂FOC(L∗)
d∆s
.∂∆
∗
s
∂γ +
∂FOC(L∗)
d∆c
.∂∆
∗
c
∂γ
d2FOC(L∗)
dL2
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Since d
2Π
dL2 < 0,
dL∗
dγ
sign
= ∂FOC(L
∗)
∂γ +
∂FOC(L∗)
d∆s
.∂∆s∂γ +
∂FOC(L∗)
d∆c
.∂∆c∂γ .
The direct effect of change on γ is given by:
∂FOC(L∗)
∂γ
=∑
β
Pr (β)∑
vi
Pr (vi)

E
(
∂2S f (.)
∂γ∂L |∆ /∈ (∆s (.) ,∆c (.))
)
+
∂S f (.)
∂γ f (∆s|vi) d∆sdL −
∂S f (.)
∂γ f (∆s|vi) d∆cdL
+S f (.) f (∆s|vi) d2∆sdγdL − S f (.) f (∆c|vi) d
2∆c
dγdL

It is straightforward to verify that
∂2S f (∆,vi,β,L)
∂γ∂L > 0,
∂S(∆,vi,β,L)
∂γ > 0 and
d2∆s
dγdL = 0,
which results in ∂FOC(L
∗)
∂γ > 0. The derivatives of FOC with respect to ∆s and ∆c is
given by:
dFOC(L∗)
d∆s
=
[
∑
β
Pr (β)∑
vi
Pr (vi)
[
2
dS f (∆s, vi, β, L)
dL
f (∆s|v)
]
− Pr (v) f (∆s|v)
]
dFOC(L∗)
d∆c
=
[
Pr (v) f (∆c|v)−∑
β
Pr (β)∑
vi
Pr (vi)
[
2
dS f (∆c, vi, β, L)
dL
f (∆c|v)
]]
Moreover, it is straightforward to verify that both
dS f (∆s,vi,β,L)
dL and
dS f (∆c,vi,β,L)
dL
are negative. It follows from implicit function theorem that ∂∆∂γ = −
∂Se
∂γ
∂Se
∂∆
. It is
straightforward to verify that Se(L,∆, β, θI) is decreasing in γ, increasing in ∆ for
∆ > 0 and decreasing in ∆ for ∆ < 0. Hence, ∂∆
∗
c
∂γ > 0 and
∂∆∗s
∂γ < 0. Therefore,
∂FOC(L∗)
d∆s
.∂∆
∗
s
∂γ > 0 and
∂FOC(L∗)
d∆c
.∂∆
∗
c
∂γ > 0, completing the proof.
An analogous proof can be written for α f and αe.
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APPENDIX B.
PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 3
This appendix contains the proofs of all results presented in Chapter 3.
Proof of Lemma 1. In determining the interest rate, the lender equates his ex-
pected return from lending to the return from investing in risk-free asset. That is,
the following condition holds:
[
RtθHrtH + (1− Rt) θLrtL
]
(1+ i∗t ) +
[
RtθH
(
1− rtH
)
+ (1− Rt) θL
(
1− rtL
)]
βM =
(
1+ ir f
)
Taking total differentials of the above equation gives us:
[
RtθHrtH + (1− Rt) θLrtL
]
d (1+ i∗t ) +
[(
θHrtH − θLrtL
)
(1+ i∗t − βM) + (θH − θL) βM
]
dRt = 0
Substituting for 1+ i∗t from equation (3.2) it can be shown that (θHrH − θLrL)(1+
i∗t − βM)+ (θH− θL)βM can be simplified to θHrtH[1+ ir f − θLβM]+ θLrtL[θHβM−
(1 + ir f )] ≥ 0. Combining this with the fact that RtθHrtH + (1− Rt) θLrtL ≥ 0, the
negative relation between rating and interest rate is easy to see.
Again, differentiating equation (3.2) with respect to βM gives us:
d
dβM
(1+ i(Rt)) =
−[RtθH(1− rtH) + (1− Rt)θL(1− rtL)]
[RtθHrtH + (1− Rt)θLrtL]
≤ 0
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Since equation (3.2) is a polynomial function, it is continuous in all its parameters.
Proof of Proposition 6. We find that Rt+1|d,st − Rt+1|d,st
sign
=
(
θLrtL − θHrtH
)
and
hence, EVθ
(
Rt+1|d
)
− EVθ
(
Rt+1|d
) sign
=
(
θLrtL − θHrtH
)
.
Step 1: r∗tH = r
∗t
L = 1 is always an equilibrium for Rt ≥ Rut .
Proof: For Rt ≥ Rut , βM − (1+ i∗) ≥ 0 with the inequality being strict for
Rt > Rut . Also, r
∗t
H = r
∗t
L > 0 implies that θLr
∗t
L < θHr
∗t
H and hence [EVθ
(
Rt+1|d
)
−
EVθ
(
Rt+1|d
)
] < 0. Then βM − (1+ i∗) + EVθ
(
Rt+1|d
)
− EVθ
(
Rt+1|d
)
≥ 0 and
neither of the borrowers would have an incentive to deviate.
Recall that in a one shot game, conditional on project’s success, borrowers find
it optimal to not default on their loan if current rating Rt ≥ Rut ≡
[
1+ir f
βM − θL
]
1
θH−θL .
It is easy to see that this will continue to be on optimal strategy for the repeated
game too.
Step 2: r∗tH = r
∗t
L = 0 is always an equilibrium for Rt < R
u
t .
Proof: For Rt < Rut , βM − (1+ i∗) < 0. Also, r∗tH = r∗tL = 0 implies that
θLr∗tL = θHr
∗t
H = 0 and hence
[
EVj
(
Rt+1|d
)
− EVj
(
Rt+1|d
)]
= 0. Then βM −
(1+ i∗) + EVj
(
Rt+1|d
)
− EVj
(
Rt+1|d
)
< 0 and neither of the types of borrowers
would have an incentive to deviate.
Step 3: There exists no equilibrium for which 0 < r∗tH < 1.
It can be seen from previous discussion that 0 < r∗H < 1 is possible only if
Rt ≤ Rut . If 0 < r∗H < 1, then it satisfies βM −
(
1+ i∗rH ,rL
)
= EVH
(
Rt+1|d
)
−
EVH
(
Rt+1|d
)
. Since,
dEVH(Rt+1|d)
drH
≤ 0 and dEVH
(
Rt+1|d
)
drH
≥ 0, the right hand side
of this expression is decreasing in rH. Since interest rate is increasing in r∗tH for
Rt ≤ Rut , at r∗H = 1, βM−
(
1+ i∗1,rL
)
> EVH
(
Rt+1|d
)
− EVH
(
Rt+1|d
)
holds.
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We proceed towards showing that for Rt < Rut there is a possibility of existence
of another equilibrium where r∗tj > 0. The borrower’s optimal strategy maximizes
expression (3.1) given as under:
M− (1+ i∗t)+ EVj (Rt+1|d¯) ≥ (1− β) M + EVj (Rt+1|d)
Since i∗t is decreasing in Rt, a sufficient condition for the existence of such an
equilibrium requires EVj
(
Rt+1|d
)
− EVj
(
Rt+1|d
)
to be increasing in Rt. If this
condition is violated, it is possible that such an equilibrium does not exist, in
which case, RtθH (ps) = RtθL (ps) = R
u
t . For the rest of the analysis, we assume
that this condition is satisfied and such an equilibrium exists. Then we can say the
following:
Step 4: If, given R′t, there exists an equilibrium such that r∗tj (R
′
t) = 1, then
there exists an equilibrium such that r∗tj (Rt) = 1 for all Rt ≥ R′t.
Proof: Consider θ = θH. Let R′t denote the rating for which an equilibrium
with p∗tH (R
′
t) = 1 exists. Since r
∗t
H (R
′
t) = 1, the following condition is satisfied at
R′t:
βM−
(
1+ i∗
(
R′t
)
1,rL
)
> EVH
(
R′t+1|d
)
|(1,rL)
− EVH
(
R′t+1|d
)
|(1,rL)
(B.1)
Consider Rt > R′t. The payoff to the high type of borrower from choosing
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rH (Rt) = 1 is given by:
βM−
(
1+ i∗ (Rt)1,rL
)
> βM−
(
1+ i∗
(
R′t
)
1,rL
)
(Because i∗ is decreasing in Rt)
> EVH
(
R′t+1|d
)
|(1,rL)
− EVH
(
R′t+1|d
)
|(1,rL)
(From Equation B.1)
> EVH
(
Rt+1|d
)
|(1,rL)
− EVH
(
Rt+1|d
)
|(1,rL)
An analogous proof would hold for θ = θL.
Notice that equation 3.1 is strictly increasing in Rt and would be satisfied with
equality for a unique value of Rt. The level of rating for this would happen is
denoted by Rtθ (ps). Lastly, we prove that RtθH (ps) ≤ RtθL (ps). Now there
are two possibilities here. First, EVH
(
Rt+1|d
)
− EVH
(
Rt+1|d
)
≤ EVL
(
Rt+1|d
)
− EVL
(
Rt+1|d
)
in which r∗tL = 0 for all Rt < RtθH (ps) and hence RtθH (ps) =
RtθL (ps). The other possibility is EVH
(
Rt+1|d
)
−
EVH
(
Rt+1|d
)
> EVL
(
Rt+1|d
)
− EVL
(
Rt+1|d
)
≥ 0.
Proof of Lemma 2. It can be seen from Lemma (6) that borrower’s repayment
probabilities r∗tH = r
∗t
L = 0 for R < RtθH (ps) ≤ Rut ≡
[
1+ir f
βM − θL
]
1
θH−θL . Then
the lenders’ payoff from lending is [RtθH + (1− Rt) θL] βM < 1 + ir f - the return
from not lending. Hence, no lending would occur.
It is easy to see that lending would be an optimal choice for Rt ≥ RtθH (ps) as
the interest rate given by equation (3.2) would ensure that the lender is indifferent
between lending and not lending.
Proof of Proposition 7.
The following two situations can arise:
Case 1 Rt = 0 or 1. Then Rt+1|d,st = Rt+1|d,st = Rt for s
t ∈ {sH, sL}. Then,
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Vj
(
Rt+1|d,st
)
= Vj
(
Rt+1|d,st
)
and hence, EVj
(
Rt+1|d
)
− EVj
(
Rt+1|d
)
= 0.
Clearly, 1+ i∗tθ becomes independent of ps.
Case 2 0 < Rt < 1.Recall that for θ ∈ {θH, θL}, Rtθ (ps) solves
βM−
(
1+ i∗ (Rt)rH ,rL
)
≥ EVj
(
Rt+1|d
)
|(rH ,rL)
− EVj
(
Rt+1|d
)
|(rH ,rL)
(B.2)
At RtθH (ps), rH = 1 and rL = 0. The realized rating after observing a not
default (d) in stage t is Rt+1|d,st = 1 for all s
t ∈ {sH, sL}. Clearly, Rt+1|d,st and
hence EVH
(
Rt+1|d
)
is independent of ps . The realized ratings after observ-
ing a default (d), conditional on the observed signal, are given by: Rt+1|d,sH =
ps(1−θH)Rt
ps(1−θH)Rt+(1−ps)(1−Rt) and Rt+1|d,sL =
(1−ps)(1−θH)Rt
(1−ps)(1−θH)Rt+ps(1−Rt) . It is easy to see that
Rt+1|d,sH is increasing in ps and Rt+1|d,sL is decreasing in ps. Thus, EVH
(
Rt+1|d
)
is
increasing in ps. Since, the left hand side of equation (B.2) is increasing in Rt and
the right hand side is decreasing in Rt, the level of rating RtθH (ps) which satisfies
equation (B.2) is increasing in ps.
At RtθL (ps), rH = 1 and rL = 1. It can be seen from the previous argument,
that it would be suffice to show that the right hand side of the equation (B.2) is
increasing in ps for θ = θL also. Now the right hand side of the equation (B.2) can
be rewritten as
ps
[
VL
(
Rt+1|d,sL
)
−VL
(
Rt+1|d,sL
)]
+ (1− ps)
[
VL
(
Rt+1|d,sH
)
−VL
(
Rt+1|d,sH
)]
(B.3)
Given Rt,
∣∣∣VL (Rt+1|d,sL)−VL (Rt+1|d,sL)∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣VL (Rt+1|d,sH)−VL (Rt+1|d,sH)∣∣∣
holds (Because of the concavity of the VL (.) function). It can be shown that for all
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Rt ≤ R ≡ 1θH−θL
[
1+ir f
βM − θL
]
and for all θL ∈
[
1− θH, 1+ir fM
)
, Rt+1|d,sL − Rt+1|d,sL is
increasing in ps and hence VL
(
Rt+1|d,sL
)
− VL
(
Rt+1|d,sL
)
is also increasing in ps.
Then EVj
(
Rt+1|d
)
|(rH ,rL)
− EVj
(
Rt+1|d
)
|(rH ,rL)
increases in ps.
As ps converges to 1, Rt+1|d,sH −Rt+1|d,sH → Rt+1|d,sL −Rt+1|d,sL → 0 and hence
EVj
(
Rt+1|d
)
− EVj
(
Rt+1|d
)
→ 0. Since i∗ is continuous in Rt, this implies that as
ps → 1, Rtθ(ps)→ Rut .
Proof of Proposition 8.
The result follows by combining Lemma (2) and Proposition (7).
Proof of Lemma 3. The rating Rt in stage t is given by:
Rt =
q∏tτ=1 Pr
(
sτ, cτ−1|θ = θH
)
q∏tτ=1 Pr (sτ, cτ−1|θ = θH) + (1− q)∏tτ=1 Pr (sτ, cτ−1|θ = θL)
Since st and ct−1 are independent of each other, this can be rewritten as
Rt =
1
1+ 1−qq .∏
t
τ=1
Pr(st|θ=θL)
Pr(st|θ=θH) .∏
t
τ=1
Pr(ct−1|θ=θL)
Pr(ct−1|θ=θH)
Let us define ρ1t ≡ ∏tτ=1
Pr(st|θ=θL)
Pr(st|θ=θH) and ρ2t ≡ ∏
t
τ=1
Pr(ct−1|θ=θL)
Pr(ct−1|θ=θH) .
1. Let η1t denote the number of times the observed signal sτ = sH for all τ ≤ t.
Then signal st = sL is observed in t− η1t periods. Since the observed signals
st are independently and identically distributed across time, the past history
of signals can be summarized by a number reflecting the numbers of times
a given signal is observed. ρ1t can be rewritten as:
ρ1t =
 p1− ηtts (1− ps) ηtt
p
ηt
t
s (1− ps)1−
ηt
t
t =
 p1− 2ηtts
(1− ps)1−
2ηt
t
t
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Notice that ps1−ps > 1. Also, a direct application of Law of Large Num-
bers tells us that as t → ∞, ηtt →
 ps if θ = θH1− ps if θ = θL and 1 − 2ηtt → < 0 if θ = θH> 0 if θ = θL . This, in turn, implies that ρ1t →
 0 if θ = θH∞ if θ = θL .
2. Let η2t denote the number of times dτ = d until period t. Given law of large
numbers and borrowers equilibrium strategies, we can say that if θ = θH
then η2tt → θH. Otherwise, it is bounded above by θL. Then for any given{
cτ−1
}t
τ=0,∏
t
τ=1 Pr
(
ct−1|θ = θL
)
= 0 if θ = θH and∏tτ=1 Pr
(
ct−1|θ = θH
)
=
0 if θ = θL. Hence, ρ2t →
 0 if θ = θH∞ if θ = θL .
Combining these, we can say that Rt →
 1 if θ = θH0 if θ = θL . Taking deriva-
tives of ρ1t and Rt with respect to ps reveals that
dρ1t
dps
→
 < 0 if θ = θH> 0 if θ = θL and
hence, dRtdps →
 > 0 if θ = θH< 0 if θ = θL .
Proof of Proposition 9. Differentiating dρ1tdps with respect to ps and taking limits
reveals that d
2ρ1t
dp2s
> 0. Hence, ρt is convex in the informativeness of the signal,
which is right meaning the convergence/divergence happens at a faster rate as
signals become more informative. And d
2Rt
dp2s
→
 > 0 if θ = θH< 0 if θ = θL .
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APPENDIX C.
FIGURES AND TABLES FOR CHAPTER 4
This appendix contains the figures and tables referenced in Chapter 4.
Figure C.1: Distribution of Listings, Loans and Defaults across the different credit
grades
This breakdown is derived from the entire data sample used for analysis.
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Figure C.2: Default percentage and variation in treatment
Data are divided into 30 day bins on either side of the treatment date and default rates are
calculated inside each bin as the fraction of the loans in default.
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Figure C.3: Default percentage within 9 months from origination and variation in
treatment
Data are divided into 30 day bins on either side of the treatment date and default rates
are calculated inside each bin as the fraction of loans that default within 9 months from
origination.
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Figure C.4: Default Rates within 60 day bins – by borrower risk type
Data are divided into 60 day bins on either side of the treatment date. Default rates are
calculated inside each bin separately for each risk type as the fraction of the particular risk
type of loans in default.
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Figure C.5: Internal Rate of Returns within 60 day bins – by borrower risk type
Data are divided into 60 day bins on either side of the treatment date. Internal rates of
return are calculated inside each bin separately for each risk type as the mean internal rate
of return of the particular risk type of loans.
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Table C.1: Definitions of credit score bins and distribution of loans
Group Credit Score Range Credit Grades Number of Loans Percentage of Loans
1 520 - 539
HR
1,558 5.76
2 540 - 559 1,586 5.86
3 560 - 579
E
1,407 5.2
4 580 - 599 830 3.07
5 600 - 619
D
3,184 11.77
6 620 - 639 1,908 7.05
7 640 - 659
C
3,917 14.48
8 660 - 679 1,646 6.09
9 680 - 699
B
2,883 10.66
10 700 - 719 1,442 5.33
11 720 - 739
A
2,191 8.1
12 740 - 759 1,060 3.92
13 760 - 779
AA
1,790 6.62
14 780 - 799 721 2.67
15 800 and above 923 3.41
27,046 100
This breakdown is derived from the entire data sample used for analysis.
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Table C.2: Descriptive Statistics
Before Treatment After Treatment
High Risk1 Low Risk2 High Risk1 Low Risk2 Difference-in-Differences
BidCount 101.3524 180.6357 89.9406 232.285 63.06***
(106.3736) (161.4169) (83.3858) (175.9405) (3.635)
BorrowerRate 0.209 0.1197 0.2239 0.1332 -0.00133
(0.0521) (0.0372) (0.078) (0.0502) (0.00134)
Home Ownership (=1) 0.3389 0.6002 0.352 0.6298 0.0165
(0.4734) (0.4899) (0.4776) (0.4829) (0.0122)
Image in listing (=1) 0.6471 0.6478 0.6558 0.6598 0.00323
(0.4779) (0.4777) (0.4751) (0.4738) (0.0121)
Rating of Group (0 to 5) 0.7979 0.7421 0.3184 0.2236 -0.0390*
(0.8391) (1.0844) (0.8254) (0.7828) (0.0235)
Default Percentage 0.4632 0.2183 0.4011 0.2660 0.110***
(0.4987) (0.4131) (0.4901) (0.4419) (0.0115)
Internal Rate of Return -0.2270 -0.0479 -0.1692 -0.1082 -0.118***
(0.5079) (0.3413) (0.4919) (0.3946) (0.0107)
Observations 7599 4032 8437 6978
1 Borrowers with a credit score lower than 680 are defined as high risk.
2 Borrowers with a credit score lower of 680 and more are defined as low risk.
Notes: Each cell contains the mean and standard deviation in parenthesis. The differences in
differences were calculated from a regression similar to equation (2) with each of the variables as
the outcome.
* Significant at the 10% level
** Significant at the 5% level
*** Significant at the 1% level
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Table C.3: Time Series Approach
Panel A: Window Outcomes 1 2 3 4 5
Default Rate within month n of origination
Not Reported to TU (n = 6) 0.0160*** 0.0176*** 0.0209*** 0.0337*** 0.0679***
(0.00373) (0.00375) (0.00370) (0.00551) (0.0113)
Default rate pre treatment 0.0817 0.1120 0.1660
Percentage effect 25.6% 30% 40.9%
Not Reported to TU (n = 9) 0.0188*** 0.0192*** 0.0303*** 0.0477*** 0.105***
(0.00525) (0.00527) (0.00518) (0.00739) (0.0144)
Default rate pre treatment 0.1340 0.1778 0.2514
Percentage effect 22.6% 26.8% 41.8%
Not Reported to TU (n = 12) 0.0132** 0.0131* 0.0303*** 0.0521*** 0.111***
(0.00670) (0.00672) (0.00657) (0.00926) (0.0175)
Default rate pre treatment 0.1781 0.2342 0.3197
Percentage effect 17% 22.2% 34.7%
Panel B: Overall outcomes Default Rate
Not Reported to TU 0.0317 0.0329 0.0948***
(0.0243) (0.0244) (0.0238)
Default rate pre treatment 0.3783
Percentage effect 25%
Internal Rate of Return
Not Reported to TU -0.00326 -0.00434 -0.0661***
(0.0234) (0.0235) (0.0233)
IRR pre treatment -0.1649
Percentage effect 40%
Observations 27046 27046 27046 16036 5381
Risk Types All All All < 680 creditscore
< 600 credit
score
Month of origin FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Each cell represents a separate regression. The unit of observation is a loan. The controls
include number of bids on the loan, interest rate, dummy for homeownership of the borrower,
dummy for an image on the listing, borrower’s group rating and the lower bound of his credit
score. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
* Significant at the 10% level
** Significant at the 5% level
*** Significant at the 1% level
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Table C.4: Differences-in-differences Approach: Linear estimates
1 2 Pre-treatmentRates
Panel A: Window Outcomes Default Rate within month n of origination
High Risk X PreTreatment (n = 6) 0.0489*** 0.0685*** 0.1120
(0.0156) (0.0223)
Percentage effect 44% 61%
High Risk X PreTreatment (n = 9) 0.0790*** 0.0758*** 0.1778
(0.0251) (0.0249)
Percentage effect 43% 43%
High Risk X PreTreatment (n = 12) 0.0973*** 0.100*** 0.2342
(0.0326) (0.0329)
Percentage effect 42% 43%
Panel B: Overall outcomes Default Rate
High Risk X PreTreatment 0.111*** 0.0934*** 0.4632
(0.0312) (0.0276)
Percentage effect 24% 20%
Internal Rate of Return
High Risk X PreTreatment -0.131*** -0.126*** -0.2270
(0.0373) (0.0327)
Percentage effect 58% 56%
Observations 30 30
Credit Range Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Additional Controls No Yes
Notes: Each cell represents a separate regression. The unit of observation is a credit
range in the pre or post period. The controls include number of bids on the loan,
interest rate, dummy for homeownership of the borrower, dummy for an image
on the listing and the borrower’s group rating. The percentage effect is calculated
by using the default rates and internal rates of return of high risk borrowers in
the pre treatment period. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
* Significant at the 10% level
** Significant at the 5% level
*** Significant at the 1% level
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Table C.5: Differences-in-differences Approach: Log-Linear estimates
1 2
Panel A: Window outcomes log(Default rate within month n of origination)
High Risk X PreTreatment (n = 6) 0.681*** 0.904***
(0.168) (0.263)
High Risk X PreTreatment (n = 9) 0.891*** -0.0729
(0.275) (0.277)
High Risk X PreTreatment (n = 12) 0.812*** 0.0717
(0.213) (0.150)
Panel B: Overall outcomes log(Default rate)
High Risk X PreTreatment 0.384*** 0.0511
(0.105) (0.0919)
Observations 30 30
Credit Range Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Additional Controls No Yes
Notes: Each cell represents a separate regression. The unit of observation is a credit
range in the pre or post period. The controls include number of bids on the loan,
interest rate, dummy for home ownership of the borrower, dummy for an image on
the listing and the borrower’s group rating. Robust standard errors are reported in
parenthesis.
* Significant at the 10% level
** Significant at the 5% level
*** Significant at the 1% level
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